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Deconstructive Practice and Legal
Theory
J. M. Balkint
The stone that the builders rejected has become
the chief cornerstone.
-Psalms 118:22
The purpose of this Article is to introduce legal readers to the ideas of
the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, and to his philosophical prac-
tices regarding the interpretation of texts, sometimes known as deconstruc-
tion.1 The term "deconstruction" is much used in legal writings these
days,2 and in this Article I propose to explain its philosophical underpin-
nings. Many persons who use the word "deconstruction" regard it as no
more than another expression for "trashing," that is, showing why legal
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James Kushner, for their comments on a previous draft.
1. Derrida has developed his ideas in several books and essays dating from 1967, some of which
have only recently been translated into English. J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (B. Johnson trans.
1981) [hereinafter DISSEMINATION]; J. DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (1982) [hereinafter
MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY]; J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976) [hereinafter OF GRAM-
MATOLOGY]; J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1981) [hereinafter POSITIONS]; J. DERRIDA, SPURS (1979)
[hereinafter SPURS]; J. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (1973) [hereinafter SPEECH AND PHE-
NOMENA]; J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (1978) [hereinafter WRITING AND DIFFER-
ENCE]; Derrida, The Law of Genre, 7 GLYPH 202 (1980); Derrida, Limited Inc abc . .. , 2 GLYPH
162 (1977) [hereinafter Limited Inc abc].
The best general introduction to Derrida's thought is J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION (1982).
Other good sources are H. STATEN, WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984) (suggesting Anglo-
American philosophical approach to deconstruction); Johnson, Translator's Introduction to DISSEMI-
NATION, supra, at vii; Rorty, Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida, 10 NEw
LITERARY HIST. 141 (1978); Spivak, Translator's Preface to OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra, at ix
(essay requires familiarity with continental philosophers and Freud). None of these has considered the
relevance of Derrida's thought to legal theory.
2. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1288-99
(1984) (citing Derrida's notions of "dangerous supplement"); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473
(1984); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984); Note, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Edu-
cation, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1141 (1985); Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical
Deconstruction (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 209, 229-35 (1984).
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doctrines are self-contradictory, ideologically biased, or indeterminate.' By
the term "deconstruction," however, I do not have in mind merely sting-
ing criticism, but specific techniques and philosophical ideas that Derrida
and his followers have applied to various texts. These techniques often do
involve teasing out the hidden antinomies in our language and thought,
and that is primarily how I came to be interested in them." However, I
hope to demonstrate that "deconstruction," as I use the term, is not simply
a fancy way of sticking out your tongue, but a practice that raises impor-
tant philosophical issues for legal thinkers.
Lawyers should be interested in deconstructive techniques for at least
three reasons. First, deconstruction provides a method for critiquing ex-
isting legal doctrines; in particular, a deconstructive reading can show
how arguments offered to support a particular rule undermine themselves,
and instead, support an opposite rule. Second, deconstructive techniques
can show how doctrinal arguments are informed by and disguise ideologi-
cal thinking. This can be of value not only to the lawyer who seeks to
reform existing institutions, but also to the legal philosopher and the legal
historian. Third, deconstructive techniques offer both a new kind of inter-
pretive strategy and a critique of conventional interpretations of legal
texts.
Although Derrida is a philosopher, his work has been applied mainly
to problems of literary criticism; as a result much of the literature on
deconstruction is written by literary critics and scholars.5 Adapting the
work of Derrida and other literary critics to the problems of legal and
political thought is not, however, as difficult as might first appear. Der-
rida is above all interested in the connection (and misconnection) between
what we want to say and the signs we use to express our meaning. In
short, he is interested in the interpretation of texts, and that is hardly
strange territory for lawyers, who spend most of their time trying to un-
derstand what other lawyers have said in legal texts. On the other hand,
explaining deconstructive practice is no small undertaking. Like many
French intellectuals of his day, Derrida was schooled in the continental
3. For example, Spann associates deconstruction with a critique of formalism in legal reasoning,
or with the more general project of demonstrating that legal reasoning is indeterminate. Spann, supra
note 2, at 536-43. But see Hegland, supra note 2, at 1203-05 (uses term "deconstruction" in same
way, but argues that premise of deconstruction is wrong; principles can be determined).
4. I have argued that legal and moral thought in general is antinomal though not irrational.
Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1987); Balkin, Taking
Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 U.M.K.C. L. REv. (forthcoming).
5. E.g., H. BLOOM, P. DE MAN, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN & J. MILLER, DECONsTRUCTION
AND CRITICISM (1979); J. CULLER, supra note 1; B. JOHNSON, THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE (1980);
V. LEITCH, DECONSTuariVE CRITICISM (1983); P. DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING: FIGURAL
LANGUAGE IN ROUSSEAU, NIETZSCHE, RILKE, AND PROUST (1979); P. DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND
INSIGHT (1983).
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tradition of philosophy, whose major influences are Hegel, Husserl, and
Heidegger. None of these philosophers is known for clarity of exposition,
and Derrida often does little better than his intellectual predecessors. 6 For
this reason, I will attempt to translate his ideas into a form that can be
more easily understood by those familiar with the Anglo-American schools
of philosophy.
The use of the term "translation" is quite deliberate. It is now com-
monplace to suggest that a translation can never fully capture the sense of
the original. However, this point is especially significant in discussing
Derrida's work. Derrida has chosen a self-consciously obscure and self-
referential style, overflowing with concealed allusions and counterallu-
sions. As I will discuss more fully later, his style may reflect his critique
of Western thought's emphasis on unambiguous and foundational con-
cepts.7 I am thus put in an especially precarious position because my goal
is to represent clearly and simply the ideas of a philosopher who eschews
clarity and simplicity in his own work. My explanation must involve a
kind of alteration-I must simplify, interpret, and reinterpret Derrida as
much as I explain him.8
I also engage in translation in the sense that Derrida does not write
about legal, but rather about philosophical and literary, texts. In explain-
ing Derrida's practices to a legal audience, I will focus on those areas of
his work that have the most relevance to legal writing and thought. This
too, requires selection, editorial judgment, and reinterpretation. What in-
terests me most about Derrida's work is the possibility that deconstruction
can shed light on theories of ideological thinking: how people form and
use ideologies, consciously or unconsciously, in legal discourse. Derrida's
work is not primarily about epistemology or the sociology of knowledge,
but his work has relevance to these disciplines. For that reason, I empha-
size some points in Derrida's writings that others (including Derrida)
might not choose to emphasize.
A final obstacle to explaining deconstruction comes from the nature of
Derrida's project. Because Derrida and his followers insist that decon-
6. At least one writer believes that structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, most of whom
were French, deliberately adopted an obfuscatory style in reaction to the bourgeois French preference
for la clariti: a simple, clear, and elegant style in accordance with the "narrower stylistic bounds of
orthodox academic discourse" expected of French intellectuals. Sturrock, Introduction to STRuc-
TURALISM AND SINCE 16-17 (J. Sturrock ed. 1979). The style of modern French philosophical writ-
ers, such as Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Derrida, was designed to chal-
lenge that paradigm of "proper" philosophical expression. Id. If this were in fact the goal of these
writers, it bears noting that one can always have too much of a good thing.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 12-16.
8. Indeed, a deconstructionist might argue that the process of repetition alters as it repeats, so that
any explanation involves alteration of some sort. See infra note 53. This point takes on a special
urgency with a writer as elusive as Derrida, whose very work celebrates the gap between that which
represents and that which is represented.
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struction is not a philosophical position but rather a practice, 9 it is neither
possible nor desirable to state a deconstructionist creed. Thus, my goal in
this Article is to offer ways of bringing the concerns and methods of
deconstructionists to the study of legal issues. Instead of describing what a
deconstructionist believes, I will explain what a deconstructionist does and
will attempt to show how one does "it" to legal texts. Not surprisingly,
underlying deconstructive activities are philosophical presuppositions
about language, thought, and the world. Such presuppositions are impli-
cated in Derrida's work, even if he himself would not admit to them as a
statement of a "position." I will try to make clear these hidden assump-
tions as the need arises.10
The two deconstructive practices that this Article will address are the
inversion of hierarchies and the liberation of the text from the author. I
believe these issues have the most relevance to what legal thinkers do
when they analyze legal texts. They also have the most relevance to the
study of ideology and the social and political theories underlying our legal
system.
I. THE INVERSION OF HIERARCHIES
A. The Metaphysics of Presence
Described in its simplest form, the deconstructionist project involves the
identification of hierarchical oppositions, followed by a temporary reversal
of the hierarchy. Thus, to use Derrida's favorite example, if the history of
Western civilization has been marked by a bias in favor of speech over
writing we should investigate what it would be like if writing were more
important than speech. We should attempt to see speech as a kind of writ-
ing, as ultimately parasitic upon writing, as a special case of writing,
rather than the other way around. In so doing, we reverse the privileged
position of speech over writing, and temporarily substitute a new priority.
This new priority is not meant to be permanent, for it may in turn be
reversed using identical techniques. The point is not to establish a new
conceptual bedrock, but rather to investigate what happens when the
9. E.g., J. CULLER, supra note 1, at 95 (deconstruction as philosophical strategy); C. NORRIS,
DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 31 (1982) ("Deconstruction is. . . an activity of read-
ing which remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates, and which can never set up independently
as a self-enclosed system of operative concepts."); C. NORRIS, THE DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN: ESSAYS
IN THE RHETORIC OF PHILOSOPHY 6 (1983) ("It has become almost a ritual gesture among writers
on deconstruction to insist that what they are doing is in no sense a species of conceptual exegesis or
analysis. Deconstruction is first and last a textual activity.").
10. In doing so, my descriptions may well be seen by literary theorists, for example, as untrue to
their understanding of deconstruction. However, just as deconstructive theorists take pride in the in-
ability of others to systematize their work, I take comfort in the fact that an "orthodox deconstruction"
is a contradiction in terms.
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given, "common sense" arrangement is reversed. Derrida believes that we
derive new insights when the privileging in a text is turned on its head.
For Derrida, hierarchies of thought are everywhere. They can be found
in the following assertions: A is the rule and B is the exception; A is the
general case and B is the special case; A is simple and B is complex; A is
normal and B is abnormal; A is self-supporting and B is parasitic upon it;
A is present and B is absent; A is immediately perceived and B is inferred;
A is central and B is peripheral; A is true and B is false; A is natural and
B is artificial. Indeed, my labelling of these ideas as A and B involves a
hierarchical move because the letter A precedes B in the alphabet.
For Derrida, any hierarchical statements about a set of ideas A and B
is an invitation for a deconstructive reversal-to show that the property
we ascribe to A is true of B and the property we ascribe to B is true of A.
Our deconstruction will show that A's privileged status is an illusion, for
A depends upon B as much as B depends upon A. We will discover, then,
that B stands in relation to A much like we thought A stood in relation to
B. Indeed, it is possible to find in the very reasons that A is privileged
over B the reasons that B is privileged over A. Having reversed the hier-
archy, we are able to see things about both A and B that we had never
noticed before."1
Any hierarchical opposition of ideas, no matter how trivial, can be
deconstructed in this way. For Derrida, however, deconstruction is more
than a clever intellectual parlor game. It is a means of intellectual discov-
ery, which operates by wrenching us from our accustomed modes of
thought. In fact, Derrida was led to this practice of deconstruction by his
dissatisfaction with Western philosophical practice from Plato's time to
our own.
12
Derrida sees his major project as exposing the bias in Western philoso-
phy he calls the "metaphysics of presence." 1 Each of the above opposi-
tions privileges a kind of "presence" over a corresponding kind of "ab-
sence." To Derrida, Western conceptions of philosophy proceed from the
hidden premise that what is most apparent to our consciousness-what is
11. The word "hierarchy" probably has political connotations to many legal readers. These con-
notations are unfortunate, for they may lead to a misunderstanding and oversimplification of Der-
rida's critique. Derrida's work is not concerned with the privileging of certain social groups over
others (although it can be so applied), but with the privileging of certain ideas over others. We may,
in fact, discover as we deconstruct legal texts that the privileging of ideas (as occurs in an ideology)
has a connection to the privileged place that certain social groups enjoy. However, this connection is
not a direct one. Our first task is to investigate the connections among ideas.
12. See J. CULLER, supra note 1, at 92-94, 100; Or GRAMMATOLOGY, sup ra note 1, at 3, 10-18,
46; see also Rorty, supra note 1, at 145.
13. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 49 (metaphysics of presence is irrepressible desire
for transcendental signified presence, the thing itself, or truth); see also J. CU.R, supra note 1, at
92 ("Philosophy has been a 'metaphysics of presence,' the only metaphysics we know.").
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most simple, basic, or immediate-is most real, true, foundational, or
important.
For example, the philosophical positions of an empiricist like Hume
indicate a bias in favor of immediately perceived sense data. 4 This is a
privileging of "presence" in Derrida's sense of the word. However, what
Derrida means by "presence" need not be the presence of sense data to
the mind, for a philosopher like Plato would argue that it is a Form or
Essence which the mind grasps most immediately 5 and which is therefore
most "present." Rather, Derrida sees the theories of Western philosophers
as expressing, at various times, a series of different metaphysical valua-
tions: subject over object, normal over abnormal, good over evil, positive
over negative, identity over difference, being over non-being, ideal over
non-ideal. Western philosophy has used the preferred concept as a ground
for theorizing and has explained the other concept in terms of it. In each
case, the preferred concept constitutes a belief in "presence," a self-
sufficient, immediately cognizable existence. 8
Three examples may help to demonstrate how Derrida hopes to reverse
these oppositional hierarchies. I will begin with perhaps the most funda-
mental concept in Western thought-the notion of identity. Philosophers
have regarded identity as a basic ground for metaphysical thought: Any-
thing that exists is identical to itself. Difference is a derivative concept
based upon identity: Two things are different if they are not identical.
The deconstructionist wants to show that the notion of identity, which
seems so basic, so "present," actually depends upon the notion of differ-
ence. Self-identity depends upon difference because a thing cannot be
identical to something unless it can be different from something else. Iden-
tity is only comprehensible in terms of difference, just as difference can
only be understood in terms of identity. We have just deconstructed the
opposition identity/difference by showing the mutual dependence these
ideas have upon each other. In doing so, we show that what was thought
to be foundational (identity) is itself dependent upon the concept it was
privileged over (difference).
It is true that having reversed this hierarchy, we could then show that
difference cannot be a foundational term for metaphysics; difference de-
pends upon identity as much as identity depends upon difference. This
outcome is not a refutation of our previous deconstructive reading. The
conclusion that neither term is foundational, but that both are mutually
14. See generally D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L. Selby-Bigge 2d ed. 1888) (all
knowledge derived from sense data).
15. See PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 40, 575 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds.
1961) (theory of Forms in Phaedo and Republic).
16. See WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 1, at 278-79; Limited Inc abc, supra note 1, at
236.
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dependent upon each other, is precisely the conclusion that Derrida wants
us to reach.
Next consider the opposition between serious discourse and non-serious
discourse.17 This opposition also involves the metaphysics of presence, al-
though at first glance the connection is not quite as obvious. When I am
speaking seriously, I mean what I say to you, so that my true intentions
are immediately present in the meaning of what I say. On the other hand,
when I am not being serious, for example, when I am joking, lying, or
reciting lines in a play, I do not really intend what I say. There is a
divergence between my true thoughts and intentions and what you hear
me saying. Now philosophers naturally are more concerned with serious
discourse than non-serious, for serious discourse is, obviously, to be taken
seriously. A philosopher would use the paradigm of serious communica-
tion as the foundation either for a theory of meaning or for a theory of
performative speech acts like promising, warning, or marrying. Non-
serious discourse, such as jokes, lies, or dramatic readings, is an aberra-
tion, an additional feature of discourse that one would explain in terms of
serious discourse after one has worked out the basic theory of serious
communication.
The opposition between the serious and the non-serious can be decon-
structed in the same manner as the opposition between identity and differ-
ence. Once again, the goal is to subvert the notion that serious discourse is
a self-contained, self-supporting ground upon which we can base a philo-
sophical theory of meaning or promising.
To deconstruct this opposition, we must introduce the notion of iter-
ability. Iterability is a property of signs. If one makes a sign, one can
make the sign again at another time, in another place, in another context.
In a simple sense, words are like signs. We are able to communicate be-
cause we can use words and combinations of words over and over again. If
we had to create new signs to express our thoughts every time we at-
tempted to communicate, we would never be able to communicate with
anyone. Thus, iterability, or the property of being able to be repeated in
many different contexts, is essential to any form of communication.
When I say "It is raining outside" or "I promise to pay you thirty
dollars for that coat," the statements I make are iterable. They can be
repeated many different times, in many different places, and in many dif-
ferent contexts. I can say them when in fact I believe it is raining, or
when I do intend to make a promise. But the feature of iterability means
that I can also say them when I am merely joking or reciting lines in a
17. The discussion that follows is loosely based on Derrida's deconstruction of J.L. Austin's work
in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 307, 321-29, and in Limited Inc abc, supra note 1, at
162.
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play. Indeed, we are brought to the surprising conclusion that we could
not use words to express ourselves seriously unless we could use the same
words non-seriously. The same property of words that allows us to ex-
press what we mean requires that we also be able to express what we do
not mean.
Serious discourse thus depends on the ability to make statements
whether or not they conform with our true intentions. That is to say, the
serious ultimately depends upon the prior existence of the non-serious.
Indeed, we can go further. If we now reconceptualize "non-serious" state-
ments as those statements in which there is no necessary connection be-
tween the statement and real intention, we may describe serious state-
ments as merely a special case of iterable non-serious statements in which
what we say happens to coincide with what we really intend.18
The work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure presents a third
example of deconstruction. Saussure distinguished between langue, the
background system of linguistic rules, and parole, the set of speech acts
made by members of a linguistic community. 9 Saussure argued that
langue was the more important element in the understanding of language
because the system of relations among various signs is what constitutes a
language. Specific examples of parole, that is specific speech acts by
speakers in a linguistic community, are only possible because of the preex-
isting langue that speakers unconsciously rely upon to understand each
other. Thus, the word "cat" is possible in English because English speak-
ers can distinguish it from "mat," "cot," and "cad." In this sense, lan-
guages are systems of differences; when an English speaker uses English
words, those words carry with them the system of differences that makes
them intelligible to other English speakers. In Derrida's terminology,
English words carry the "traces" of other words from which they are dis-
tinguished and in opposition to which they possess intelligibility.
20
However, Saussure's privileging of langue over parole as the basis of
language leads to an historical paradox: How did language begin at a
time in which there was no established system of differences that consti-
tuted a language? As Jonathan Culler explains, "If a cave man is success-
fully to inaugurate language by making a special grunt signifying 'food,'
18. In this last statement, I have used the word "non-serious" in a new sense. Originally, I used it
to mean "not serious." By the end of the deconstruction, however, it has taken on a new meaning,
namely, "stated without regard to whether the statement conforms to real intention." In reversing the
serious/non-serious opposition, I have created a broader notion of non-serious speech upon which
both the serious and the non-serious (in the former sense of the word) depend. This is a common
practice in a deconstructive reversal and involves the creation of a paleonym, a new concept with an
old name that recalls the previously subordinated concept. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
19. F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 9, 13-15, 17-20, 77 (3d ed. 1959).
20. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
750
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we must suppose that the grunt is already distinguished from other grunts
and that the world has already been divided into the categories 'food' and
'non-food.' "121
Language must have begun with speech acts, and through history the
collection of past speech acts (parole) was consolidated to create a linguis-
tic system (langue). On the other hand, speech acts could not have been
understood without some pre-existing structure that made others under-
stand that certain primordial grunts signified "This is a rock," rather
than "I am in pain." No matter how far back we go in history, each
speech act seems to require a pre-existing linguistic and semantic struc-
ture in order to be intelligible, but any such structure could not come into
being without a history of pre-existing speech acts by past speakers.
Neither langue nor parole could be a foundational concept in a theory of
language because each is mutually dependent upon the existence of the
other. 2
B. Diff~rance and Trace
The three examples of privileging that I have given all have a single
feature in common. Once the hierarchy of the more basic term over the
less basic term is deconstructed, we see that the more basic term depends
upon the less basic. Because we already know that the less basic term
depends upon the more basic, we end up asking the proverbial question:
"Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" This question neatly summa-
rizes what Derrida is trying to show in deconstructing hierarchical oppo-
sitions. He is not attempting to show that we were wrong in thinking that
difference is dependent upon identity, that the non-serious is dependent
upon the serious, or that parole is dependent upon langue. Rather, he
wants to expose what we have forgotten: that identity is also dependent
upon difference, the serious is also dependent upon the non-serious, and
langue is also dependent upon parole. In other words, neither term of the
opposition can be originary and fundamental because both are related to
each other in a system of mutual dependences and differences. Each is
continually calling upon the other for its foundation, even as it is con-
stantly differentiating itself from the other.
21. See J. CULLER, supra note 1, at 96.
22. See J. DERRIDA, Semiology and Grammatology, in PosrIONS, supra note 1, at 15, 17, 28
[hereinafter Semiology and Grammatology]. Culler refers to this as the paradox of structure and
event. J. CULLER, supra note 1, at 94-96. The same problem arises for theorists who explain obliga-
tions in terms of the existence of "practices." See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL REV. 3
(1955). Promissory obligations, for example, are explained by the practice of promising. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 42-43 (1961). By arguing that acts of promising could not come into
being before the creation of a practice of promising, these thinkers face the problem of showing how a
practice of promising could have arisen before there were any specific acts of promising.
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Derrida has a special term for the chicken-and-egg quality of mutual
dependence and difference that the terms of hierarchical oppositions have
for each other: dilefrance. Differance is a pun based upon the French
word differer, which means both to differ and to defer. Derrida replaces
an "e" with "a" in difference to make it diferance; the two words sound
exactly the same in French.2" Difjfrance simultaneously indicates that (1)
the terms of an oppositional hierarchy are differentiated from each other
(which is what determines them); (2) each term in the hierarchy defers
the other (in the sense of making the other term wait for the first term),
and (3) each term in the hierarchy defers to the other (in the sense of
being fundamentally dependent upon the other).
From differance, we can understand the idea of "trace." Both of the
terms in a hierarchical opposition rely for their coherence on the differen-
tiation between them. The relation between identity and difference, seri-
ous and non-serious, langue and parole, is one of mutual dependence and
difference, or differance. However, Derrida would also say that in each
case the first concept bears the traces of the second concept, just as the
second concept bears the traces of the first.
The word "trace" is a metaphor for the effect of the opposite concept,
which is no longer present but has left its mark on the concept we are
now considering.2 The trace is what makes deconstruction possible; by
identifying the traces of the concepts in each other, we identify their mu-
tual conceptual dependence. 5
One might ask whether the ideas of differance and trace between two
opposed concepts could form a new ground for explaining both. However,
diffrance and trace are not stable conceptions; they simply represent the
play of differences and dependences between two mutually opposed con-
cepts. Neither differance nor trace could serve as a foundational concept.
26
23. See MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 3; J. DERRIDA, Positions, in PosroNS,
supra note 1, at 39-40 [hereinafter Positions]; Semiology and Grammatology, supra note 22, at
26-28.
24. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 46-47.
25. See id. at 62-63. The phoneme /b/ is a sound in English because of its differentiation from
the set of other available sounds in that language. The idea of "trace" may be compared to the way in
which speakers are able to distinguish /b/ from other phonemes, while simultaneously being able to
identify the /b/ spoken by one person with the /b/ spoken by another. In a similar way, the concepts
in hierarchical oppositions create the possibility for each other's existence; they form, shape, or iden-
tify each other by their absence. This necessary conceptual support is the "trace" of the absent
concept.
26. See Positions, supra note 23, at 39-40. Note that this statement is itself deconstructible. The
concept of diftrance is essential (hence foundational?) to Derrida's own thought, at least as I present
it here.
Two points follow from this deconstruction. First, if we attempted to give concepts like "difrance"
and "trace" a special status, whether as foundations for deconstruction or as ineffable concepts that
escape analysis, we would fall into the very trap that Derrida seeks to avoid. Rorty, supra note 1, at
151-53. Thus, trace cannot be "divinized," as Rorty says, id. at 153, and neither can dijftrance.
These conceptions must simply describe the situation of foundationlessness, provisionality, or revers-
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Having seen one originary concept after another fall under the decon-
structionist sword, the reader might be tempted to ask whether Derrida
means to deny that there is any self-sufficient, originary foundation for a
system of thought. This is precisely the point of the deconstructionist cri-
tique of Western philosophy. Proposed foundational terms all depend ulti-
mately upon the subordinate concepts we would like to depend upon those
foundational terms. Derrida is denying the validity of the Cartesian proj-
ect of discovering an unquestionable, self-sufficient ground for
philosophy.
2'
The notions of diffrance and trace suggest a revolutionary theory of
how people grasp abstract ideas. Our commonsense view is that one holds
an idea in one's mind, and that idea is immediately present as one con-
ceives it. Thus, when I think about the idea of identity, I am thinking
about it, and not about another idea (difference). When I think about
speech, I am thinking about speech and not about writing. But we can
read Derrida's work as challenging this commonsense conception. When
we hold an idea in our minds, we hold both the idea and its opposite; we
think not of speech but of "speech as opposed to writing," or speech with
the traces of the idea of writing, from which speech differs and upon
which it depends.28 The history of ideas, then, is not the history of indi-
vidual conceptions, but of favored conceptions held in opposition to disfa-
vored conceptions. 9
ibility. The second point is that this lack of foundational concepts puts any expositor of Derrida's
thought in an unfortunate situation. These concepts are important to understanding Derrida, and one
cannot do justice to his work without discussing them. I therefore present them as essential, although
Derrida would not approve. This dilemma merely demonstrates the impossibility of giving a fully
deconstructionist account of deconstruction. See infra note 54.
27. See Rorty, supra note 1, at 159. I use the term "Cartesian" because in many ways Descartes
is the high priest of the metaphysics of presence: Descartes believed that one could ultimately base a
philosophical system upon the indubitable truth that one's existence is immediately present to one's
own consciousness. R. DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
OF DESCARTES 131 (E. Haldane & G. Ross trans. 1911).
The cogito of Descartes attempted to ground philosophy on a metaphysics of presence. Derrida did
not need to deconstruct the assertion because David Hume had already performed the task. Hume
argued that one's sense of identity is dependent upon the continuous flow of thoughts that one experi-
ences. Thus, instead of thought being dependent upon the self's identity, identity is dependent upon
the experience of thought. When Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am," he believed that he had
demonstrated the privileged nature of existence over thought (I must be, in order to be thinking at
all). Instead, Hume showed that Descartes' conclusion made knowledge of identity only an inference
from the continuous experience of thought (I know that I exist because there is a continuous stream of
thoughts). D. HUME, supra note 14, at 6. A deconstructive reading of Descartes' cogito, then, demon-
strates that identity and thought are mutually dependent upon each other in a relation of differance.
28. See Semiology and Grammatology, supra note 22, at 26. What speech is opposed to, of course,
depends upon the context.
29. This is an epistemological interpretation of Derrida. Derrida does not purport to offer a the-
ory specifically about epistemology, metaphysics, or any traditional field of philosophy. Indeed, Der-
rida would probably resist the idea that his theories were "about" anything in particular, although it
is my belief that they have many applications in such fields as literary criticism, philosophy, psychol-
ogy, and law. I offer my interpretation because of the connection I am about to make between
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It might seem at first that deconstructive practice is less important to
lawyers than to philosophers. Derrida's critique of foundational thinking
might be of great concern to philosophers searching for ultimate truth.
Philosophy usually involves a search for ultimate groundings, and so the
power of Derrida's critique is troubling. On the other hand, we do not
expect that all or even most legal doctrines can be proven to have a basis
in objective moral truth. Law is a much more pragmatic enterprise than
philosophy. However, Derrida's critique is not simply directed at meta-
physics. Derrida's point is that the privileging of presence may be found
in everyday thought as much as in abstract philosophy. Any system of
thought that proceeds by marking out the fundamental, the essential, the
normal, or the most important-in short, virtually any rational sys-
tem-can be analyzed from the standpoint of deconstructive practice.
Our understanding of legal ideas may indeed involve, as Derrida says
of speech and writing, the simultaneous privileging of ideas over their op-
posites. Legal doctrines are based upon a group of foundational concepts
and principles. Thus, in tort law, one learns the basic concepts of fault,
intent, or causation, and more recently, the notions of cost-benefit analysis
and economic efficiency. Such concepts are building blocks for further de-
velopment. Using Derrida's methods, we discover that each legal concept
is actually a privileging, in disguise, of one concept over another. By re-
vealing the opposition, and deconstructing it, we are brought to an en-
tirely different vision of moral and legal obligation.
One example of legal doctrines' reliance on privileging is the Supreme
Court's doctrine of standing. By holding that the Constitution requires a
plaintiff to show "actual" injury in order to sue,30 the Court has created a
privileging of plaintiffs who have actual injury over plaintiffs whom the
Court classifies as purely "ideological." 31 One way to deconstruct this op-
position would be to show how arguments in favor of the actual injury
requirement "undo" themselves. The goal would be to examine the stan-
dard arguments for the actual injury requirement: Plaintiffs with actual
injury are more reliable, more adversarial, and more likely to present a
concrete record for decision. We could then use these arguments against
themselves to demonstrate that ideological plaintiffs also possess these de-
privileging and ideological thinking. If we apply Derrida's work to the way people formulate and use
legal concepts, we are making a point about human psychology and the sociology of knowledge. An
epistemological interpretation is consistent with the work of Derrida's structuralist predecessors, such
as Saussure and Levi-Strauss. These thinkers argue that human consciousness is structured in terms
of mutually defined oppositions. See generally T. HAWKES, STRUCrTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS 19-58
(1977).
30. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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sired traits. Conversely, we could show how plaintiffs who possess actual
injury, but who lack ideological zeal, are less dependable, less adversarial,
and less likely to produce a concrete record for decisionmaking than their
ideological counterparts.32
This example suggests that law provides a fertile field of discourse for
deconstructive readings. Lawyers are continually involved in establishing
principles of regulatory behavior, whether in contract law, constitutional
law, or other areas, and this project necessitates the privileging of con-
cepts. Deconstruction can serve another purpose. The law reflects social
visions that involve privilegings of particular conceptions of human na-
ture. As we deconstruct legal principles, we deconstruct the ideology or
world view that informs them. Although we can use deconstruction to
show that doctrines are incomplete, or that the arguments for a given doc-
trine "undo" themselves, we can also use deconstruction as a tool for ideo-
logical and historical analysis.
C. Arguments that Undo Themselves
Deconstructive reversals show that the reasons given for privileging one
side of an opposition over the other often turn out to be reasons for
privileging the other side. The virtues of the first term are seen to be the
virtues of the second; the vices of the second are revealed to be true of the
first as well. This undoing of justifications for privileging is part of the
deconstructionist aim of "ungrounding" preferred conceptions by showing
that they cannot act as self-sufficient or self-explanatory grounds or
foundations.
The most famous example of this "ungrounding" is Derrida's treatment
of speech and writing in Of Grammatology.33 Derrida finds in the texts of
several writers, including Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss, a consis-
tent valuing of speech over writing as a form of communication.3 4 Derrida
argues that this preference is not accidental; it relates to the general
"logocentric" bias of Western thought.3 5 By "logocentric," Derrida means
centered on the concept of logos, which he often equates with the idea of
presence. Derrida believes that a privileging of speech over writing is a
symptom of a more general bias in favor of presence as a foundational
term in Western philosophical thought.
36
32. For examples of deconstruction of this doctrine, see Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A
Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980); J. Balkin, Deconstructing Article
III (Sept. 27, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file at Yale Law School Library).
33. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 34-43, 166-67.
34. Id. at 29-44 (discussing Saussure); id. at 101-268 (discussing Levi-Strauss and Rousseau).
35. Id. at 3; see infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
36. Derrida also speaks of "phonocentrism," or the privileging of voice. See, e.g., OF GRAM-
MAroLoGY, supra note 1, at 11-12. Phonocentrism normally appears in discussions of the privileging
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One might ask why speech is more "present" than writing, and why it
is more highly valued. Derrida considers several plausible arguments to
explain the privileging. First, writing is only a method of representing
speech. It was invented as a means of recording what people said.37 Writ-
ing consists of a series of signs that stand for spoken words. Thus, writing
is only a substitute for speech, and an imperfect substitute at that. For
example, written language often uses non-phonetic spellings. People who
have encountered certain words in writing but not in speech often mispro-
nounce them, and written language occasionally leads to corruptions and
alterations in natural forms of speech.
Second, speech is connected more closely to the immediate thoughts of
the communicator than is writing. When one hears a person talk, that
person's intention is immediately communicated by her speech.38 Our un-
derstanding is derived not only from words, but also from inflections and
tone of voice. Sarcasm, enthusiasm, and a hundred other nuances are im-
mediately apparent when we listen to a person; they are less discernible
when the text of a speech has been transcribed.39 Thus, the preference for
speech over writing is a privileging of presence: The immediacy of mean-
ing in speech is privileged over the mediation of thought that occurs in
writing.40 Speech is immediate, unambiguous, and sincere; writing is dis-
tant, ambiguous, and potentially misleading. 1
of speech over writing.
37. Speech is prior to writing both culturally and historically. J. GREENBERG, ANTHROPOLOGI-
CAL LINGUISTICS 22-23 (1968). Spoken language arrives in a culture before written language, and to
this day there are primitive cultures that have no written language. Id. at 22; see also S. MULLER,
THE WORLD'S LIVING LANGUAGES 107, 119 (1964) (most languages in Africa, Indonesia, and New
Guinea still unwritten). Thus, speech is a prior, and therefore more fundamental, development in the
creation of cultures and civilizations than writing.
38. Derrida argues that the direct temporal connection between speech and thought leads us to
this conclusion. He points out that in French, the expression s'entendre parler means both to hear
oneself and to understand oneself. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 98.
39. An old joke illustrates this point. A man walks past a laundry which bears a sign reading:
"My name is Fink /and what do you think /I'll do your wash for free." Thinking he has spotted a
bargain, the man takes his laundry there. The next day, when he returns to pick up his laundry, the
proprietor, Mr. Fink, asks for a payment of five dollars.
"Five dollars?" asks the man. "What about your sign?"
"Can't you read?" replies Fink. "The sign says: "'My name is Fink, and what do you think, I'll
do your wash for free?'"
The joke seems to demonstrate the capacity of writing to mislead and the superior expressive abili-
ties of speech. However, this joke also undermines the very point that the phonocentrist (the privileger
of speech) wants to make, because it was possible, in writing, to express inflection and avoid misun-
derstanding by using the correct punctuation. Indeed, were it otherwise, no one would understand the
joke in its written form. Conversely, if Mr. Fink had spoken his lines in a monotone, he still might
have been misunderstood.
40. Indeed, many people prefer to receive information from a lecture rather than by reading be-
cause they find it easier to comprehend and assimilate meaning from what a person is saying than
from what she has written. The belief that speech is a privileged way of understanding the "true
meaning" of communication is connected to Derrida's notion of logocentrism, or the privileging of
presence.
41. Barbara Johnson sums up the privileging of speech over writing:
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There are additional connections between speech and presence. Nor-
mally, a speaker is physically present when she talks to you; in contrast,
you may be reading the words written by a person who is far away and
perhaps no longer even alive. A person who is speaking to you can be
interrupted and asked to clarify what she means. The same cannot be
done with the author of a text one is reading. The author is not present,
and only the representations of her past thoughts remain on the page.
After identifying all of the characteristics that define writing, and after
arguing how they make writing inferior to speech, one can deconstruct the
opposition of speech to writing by showing how the arguments "undo
themselves." One can demonstrate that each identified characteristic of
writing is true of speech as well; in other words, speech is a kind of "writ-
ing" that suffers from the same inadequacies attributed to writing.
First, speech itself is only a sign of what is present in a person's mind;
it too is only a signifier of thought. A person's true thoughts and real
meanings must be mediated through the use of speech. Furthermore,
speech can be as unclear and ambiguous as writing, as most persons who
have attended a law school lecture can testify.
Second, for speech to function as a signifier, as a sign, speech must be
iterable. It must be possible to speak when one does not mean what one
says. Speech also can be separated from the speaker and the moment of
intention, in both space and time. One can listen to a politician speak over
a radio or television, with no chance to stop the speaker and ask for clari-
fication. One can play a recording of a speech by Martin Luther King
over and over again; the sounds one hears are no longer connected to the
thoughts of a living person. The emotional impact of recorded speech does
not come from the presence of living thought in the speech, but only from
its efficacy as a signifier of past thoughts, which have long ago faded
away.
Derrida thus shows that speech, as a signifier of thought, shares all of
the properties that we had associated with writing. Speech is merely a
special case of a generalized idea of writing. This "arche-writing" 42 is the
iterable representation of a signified by a signifier. Speech and writing (in
the normal sense of the word) are both varieties of this more generalized
form of "writing."
Derrida uses the word "writing" in this broader sense to stand for three
The spoken word is given a higher value because the speaker and listener are both present to
the utterance simultaneously. There is no temporal or spatial distance between speaker,
speech, and listener, since the speaker hears himself speak at the same moment the listener
does. This immediacy seems to guarantee the notion that in the spoken word we know what
we mean, mean what we say, say what we mean, and know what we have said.
Johnson, supra note 1, at viii.
42. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 56-57.
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basic properties of signification: (1) the substitution of the signifier for
what it signifies; (2) the mediation of the experience of the signified by the
signifier, and (3) the iterability of the signifier at different times and in
different contexts."' "Writing," as used by Derrida, is a paleonym44-a
word with an old meaning which has had a new meaning grafted on to it.
"Writing" in Derrida's general sense recalls the reversal of the hierarchy
of speech over writing from which the broader conception arises. Der-
rida's project, at least in its initial incarnation, was a call for a science of
"writing," or a Grammatology, which would investigate and expose the
hidden logocentric biases of Western thought."
D. The Logic of the Supplement
Derrida also deconstructs the hierarchy of speech over writing through
the "logic of the supplement." The term "supplement" comes from Rous-
seau, who describes writing as a "supplement" to speech.46 Writing is a
supplement to speech in that it represents speech. The "natural" condition
of language is spoken; writing is merely added later:
[S]peech being natural or at least the natural expression of thought,
. . . writing is added to it, is adjoined, as an image or representa-
tion. In that sense, it is not natural. It diverts the immediate presence
of- thought to speech into representation and the imagination. This
recourse is not only "bizarre," but dangerous. It is the addition of a
technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present
when it is actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny
of the language . ...
However, the word "supplement" has many meanings. First, it can mean
something added to an already complete or self-sufficient thing. For ex-
ample, I teach out of the latest edition of a constitutional law casebook.
The book is finished, complete in itself, but every year the publisher dis-
tributes a supplement adding cases decided by the Supreme Court after
the date of the casebook's publication. However, the fact that the pub-
lisher provides a supplement to my casebook indicates that the casebook is
incomplete as a teaching aid-it needs supplementation to make it com-
43. See id. at 44-45, 55-57; H. STATEN, supra note 1, at 60-61, 121; Limited Inc abc, supra
note 1, at 189-90.
44. See supra note 18.
45. See Semiology and Grammatology, supra note 22, at 35-36.
46. See OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 144. Similarly, Rousseau speaks of culture as a
supplement to nature and masturbation as a supplement to normal sexual relations. The latter sup-
plement Rousseau refers to as a "dangerous supplement," a phrase Derrida seizes upon as character-
istic of all supplementation. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
47. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 144.
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plete. This is the second meaning of "supplement"-something added to
something lacking in order to complete it, as one takes vitamin supple-
ments to achieve a healthy diet.
If writing is a supplement to speech, in the sense that it is added to
speech, it may well be dangerous. Writing may infect the naturalness of
speech, alter speech, or even supplant it. Some people may begin to speak
in the same stylized way in which they write. Writing may lead to mis-
takes in pronunciation. For example, uneducated French people occasion-
ally pronounce the silent consonants in their language. As time passes,
writing may become so important that all official acts are recorded, cer-
tain types of oral promises are no longer enforced, and storytellers and
town criers are replaced by authors and journalists. Rousseau's life pro-
vides an example of the displacement of speech by writing. Rousseau, who
exalted the naturalness of speech, was a writer by profession; he is now
best remembered not for what he said, but for what he wrote.48
Yet, Derrida would argue, writing can only supplement speech in the
first sense (representation of speech) if speech can be supplemented in the
second sense (having a lack that could be fulfilled). By now we know
what that lack is: Speech is not thought made present to the listener, but
aural symbols that represent thoughts. Speech only appears to possess
"presence," or a direct connection to the mind of the speaker because of
the fortuity that people speak and think simultaneously. In reality, how-
ever, speech-as-thought is a sham; like writing, speech is a mediation of
thought, a delaying through representation. It is for that reason that writ-
ing can supplement, or take the place of, speech.
Thus, we see a new meaning of the term "dangerous supplement."
Writing is indeed a dangerous supplement, not because, as Rousseau
feared, it might infect the purity of speech, but because the supplementary
capacity of writing demonstrates that speech already possesses that which
we dislike about writing. It is as if one met a lover's relatives and saw for
the first time unpleasant qualities common to the whole family.
From this Derrida wants to make a larger claim: If we thought that
speech was present and writing a mere representation of speech, we now
see that speech, too, is only a mediation of something more present.
Speech, like writing, is a supplement. (Note the crucial move in Derrida's
argument: A signifier supplements that which it signifies.) But if speech is
a supplement, that which it supplements must also be lacking, for other-
wise speech could not represent it. That new thing must, in turn, be a
48. Writing may be dangerous in still another way. Derrida argues that both Rousseau and Levi-
Strauss identified speech with nature and writing with culture. The invention of writing and its intro-
duction to primitive peoples brought a moral and spiritual decline that is closely associated with the
corrupting influence of culture upon nature. See id. at 101-40.
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supplement (signifier), which represents something further, and so on.
The result is a chain of supplements, reaching towards an unmediated,
complete, self-sufficient presence.49 To speak the language of signs, the
result is a chain of signifiers, each pointing to the next, each reaching
towards a pure, unmediated signified.5"
But now comes the great irony of this logic. The Real Thing, Presence
Itself, must, by definition, be something that could not be supplemented or
represented by a sign, for it is self-sufficient, and could not serve as a
signifier or supplement. The world as we know it is only a world of rep-
resentations, and representations of representations, ad infinitum. Every
signified is actually a signifier in disguise. Derrida describes the ultimate
deconstruction of presence:
There is nothing outside of the text . . . . What we have tried to
show by following the guiding line of the "dangerous supplement,"
is that in what one calls . . . real life . . . there has never been
anything but writing; there have never been anything but supple-
ments; substitutive significations which could only come forth in a
chain of differential references. . . . [T]he absolute present, Nature,
• . . ha[s] always already escaped, ha[s] never existed . . .51
"Writing" is all there is. This conclusion follows from Derrida's argu-
ment that a sign can only represent still another sign. Derrida's famous
aphorism il n'y a pas de hors-texte (there is nothing outside of the text) is
a metaphor which proclaims that all understanding is metaphorical.52 The
"text" of which Derrida speaks is not merely words, but life itself: "[Ojur
very relation to 'reality'. . . functions like a text."1
53
Derrida's critique can be viewed as nihilistic because it appears to deny
the existence of objective truth. On the other hand, Derrida's own argu-
ments subtly rely on the notion of truth. The basic claim is that a signifier
only imperfectly represents the thing it signifies. This is not a mistake of
logic, or an oversight on Derrida's part. We speak in logocentric terms, so
that our critique of logocentrism must rely on suspect categories of
thought. This is the case with all deconstructions; each uses the conceptual
apparatus of the very thing that it wishes to subvert.54
49. Cf id. at 152-57 (describing chain of supplements involved in Rousseau's love object).
50. Id. at 49-50.
51. Id. at 158-59.
52. Id. at 158.
53. Johnson, supra note 1, at xiv.
54. Derrida demonstrates the precarious position of the deconstructionist by placing certain con-
cepts sous rature ("under erasure"). For example, he uses the word "is' with a line through it to
show that the word is logocentrically biased ("being" is the ultimate expression of presence) yet neces-
sary for expression. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 19.
It should now become clear why explanations of deconstruction necessarily involve a modification of
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Derrida's seemingly nihilistic conclusion must be understood in the con-
text of his method of reaching it. Derrida does not deny the existence of
objective truth as much as he affirms the interpretative character of our
attempts to comprehend truth. Our "truth"-the conceptual apparatus we
create to explain the world to ourselves-is only a sign or metaphor for an
endless succession of still other signs and metaphors, and we have forgot-
ten that it is only that. Thus, the Real Truth seems always beyond our
grasp, outside the dominant conceptual apparatus, because that apparatus
is necessarily always incomplete and capable of further supplementation.
Our frustation in our attempts to experience the Real Thing, whether
we call it "truth" or "presence," stems from the desire in Western philos-
ophy to foundationalize. Here is the agenda of traditional Western philos-
ophy: One can only seek truth if one discovers fundamental principles and
builds upon them.5" We should recognize this "agenda" by now as
privileging. The act of privileging requires the privileged term to be foun-
dational, complete, self-sufficient; however, it is none of these things. It is
related to the non-privileged term in a system of mutual differentiation
and dependence, or di~ffrance.
The privileged concept is incomplete; it is only a supplement, a signi-
fier, a metaphor. For that reason, we are able to use it against itself, to
deconstruct it. The act of privileging, of asserting that one of two mutually
dependent concepts is really foundational, is like drinking from the
springs of the mythical river Lethe, after which we forget our past. Once
we have accepted the privileging, we forget that the foundational concept
was only a metaphor, a supplement. Deconstruction awakes us from our
dogmatic slumber, and reminds us that our "truth" is only an
interpretation.
E. Deconstruction and Ideology
Although these issues seem metaphysical, we can translate Derrida's
concerns into a legal setting.5" Legal doctrines both reflect and regulate
it. My attempt at explanation is a logocentric project. I seek to present the foundations of Derrida's
thought in a clear, easily comprehensible, logical progression, beginning with simple ideas and then
working to more complicated results. Obviously, there is something paradoxical about using logocen-
tric methods to develop a critique of logocentrism. However, to argue that a logocentric presentation of
deconstruction is suspect because it misstates the "true" content of Derridean thought is simply to
engage in another logocentric move, that is, that there is a privileged reading of Derrida, a true
unmediated presence, of which all interpretations are inferior copies.
55. OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 1, at 97 (history of metaphysics is history of logocentrism);
J. CuLLER, supra note 1, at 92-93 (logocentric practice in Western philosophy moves from funda-
mental ideas to elaboration of ideas); Limited Inc abc, supra note 1, at 236 (single recurrent gesture
in Western metaphysics is move from good, positive, pure, simple, and essential to evil, negative,
impure, complex, and accidental).
56. Note that I am presenting my interpretation of Derrida, which is my own "dangerous supple-
ment" to his work and my own metaphor.
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social life. The choice of protected rights and of enforcement techniques
reflect views, whether obvious or obscure, about social relations. Law tells
a story about what people are and should be.5"
To give an obvious example, laws that permit (or enforce) discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or sex tell a different story about people than
laws that prohibit such discrimination. The principles of a social theory
like Liberalism tell a story about human nature, which some accept and
others criticize.5" Even the seemingly most insignificant or neutral doc-
trines and rules, taken as a whole, have a story to tell, if we are willing to
listen to them. 9
We can think of a system of law as a community's attempt to realize
human ends. This presupposes a description of the good and bad in
human nature: what people want from their lives and what their limita-
tions are. This description necessarily involves privilegings of certain as-
pects of human nature over others. Later, we justify our system by claim-
ing that it is the best, given the natural constraints of the human
condition. For example, an advocate of laissez-faire might argue that,
given the natural self-interestedness of people, unregulated market trans-
actions are the best way to realize human goals. But the deconstructive
critique reminds us that our social vision and system of laws are not based
upon human nature as it really is, but rather upon an interpretation of
human nature, a metaphor, a privileging. We do not experience the "pres-
ence" of human nature; we experience different versions of it in the stories
we tell about what we are "really like." These stories are incomplete; they
are metaphors and can be deconstructed. Too often we forget that our
systems of law are based upon metaphor and interpretation; we mistake
the dominant or privileged vision of people and society for real "present"
human nature, as Rousseau confused speech with the presence of thought.
57. Clare Dalton uses this metaphor in her deconstruction of contract doctrine. Dalton, supra
note 2, at 999.
58. For example, it is often asserted that Liberalism's emphasis upon individual autonomy ignores
other aspects of human nature, such as the need for communal sharing of values. The vision of human
personality and responsibility that Liberalism poses is disputed both by the right and the left. Liber-
tarians argue that Liberals violate principles of self-determination and autonomy by asking people to
contribute to a common good, while Marxists argue that Liberal capitalism hides the real nature of
relations between worker and capitalist under a veneer of free exchange. Of course, one also can
criticize each of these alternatives to Liberalism as portraying a fundamentally false picture of human
nature.
59. In her deconstruction, Dalton argues that the ideology of contract law, which privileges the
view of contracts as the "neutral facilitator of private volition," and is "concerned at the periphery
with the imposition of social duties," Dalton, supra note 2, at 1014, is also present in the doctrines of
implied contracts, parol evidence, and consideration. Id. at 1014-24, 1048-52, 1066-95. She concludes
that although these doctrines in contract law may seem less overtly political in nature than others,
such as duress and unconscionability, the same tensions are at work: "[In] contract doctrine . . . a
comparatively few mediating devices are constantly deployed to displace and defer the otherwise inevi-
table revelation that public cannot be separated from private, or form from substance, or objective
manifestation from subjective intent." Id. at 1113.
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At that point, the metaphor becomes mistaken for what it describes. But
latent within the metaphor is a countervision that can be located and
brought to the surface through deconstruction. It exists within the privi-
leged conception because the latter ultimately depends upon it in a rela-
tion of difierance.
The argument of the laissez-faire advocate presupposes a vision of what
is most important about people, and necessarily relegates other aspects of
the human condition, such as altruism and community, to marginal status.
We could deconstruct this vision of humanity by showing how economic
individualism ultimately depends upon social cooperation and the sharing
of values. We could show the incompleteness of this vision of human na-
ture, its poverty in describing what people are like and the nature of their
relations to each other. A part of humanity will always escape this vision
because it is only a metaphor, a signifier. The vision suffers from a lack
that needs to be supplemented, and the supplement is a countervision that
has been relegated to the periphery. This supplement is indeed "danger-
ous," for it threatens to subvert the picture of human nature posed by the
dominant conception.60
The deconstruction of legal concepts, or of the social vision that informs
them, is not nihilistic. Deconstruction is not a call for us to forget about
moral certainty, but to remember aspects of human life that were pushed
into the background by the necessities of the dominant legal conception we
call into question. Deconstruction is not a denial of the legitimacy of rules
and principles; it is an affirmation of human possibilities that have been
overlooked or forgotten in the privileging of particular legal ideas.
Any social theory must emphasize some human values over others. Such
categorizing necessarily involves a privileging, which in turn can be
deconstructed. But the goal of deconstruction is not the destruction of all
possible social visions. By recalling the elements of human life relegated to
the margin in a given social theory, deconstructive readings challenge us
to remake the dominant conceptions of our society. We can choose to ac-
cept the challenge or not, but we will no longer cling to our social vision
blindly. Nor can we assume that this vision is the "real essence" of human
60. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing danger in supplementation). The
deconstruction of the philosophy of economic individualism is a favorite topic of the Critical Legal
Studies movement. For a classic discussion of the diftfrance between individualism and altruism, see
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARM. L. Rav. 1685 (1976). Ken-
nedy's famous statement of the "fundamental contradiction" of social life is a more general expression
of diffetance. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209,
211-13 (1979) ("[Tlhe goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible
with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it. . . . [R]elations with others are
both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom.").
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nature because that would be a claim to have experienced presence, an
experience that Derrida denies that we can ever have.
As Robert Gordon has observed, people "build structures, then act as if
(and genuinely come to believe that) the structures they have built are
determined by history, human nature, economic law." ' Deconstruction
allows us to see that ideologies are signs or metaphors that describe social
life. They are privileged conceptions of social reality; they are supple-
ments, which can in turn be supplemented. Like Derrida's signs, they are
not self-sufficient, but ultimately depend upon the very aspects of human
life that they deny and from which they differentiate themselves. Every
ideology suffers from an elementary lack: its dependence on what it de-
nies, on what it is exalted over. This lack, this differance, is what we
seize upon and exploit in a deconstructive reading.
We now see that the legal deconstructor deconstructs ideologies, which
are manifested in particular legal doctrines. By challenging what is
"given," deconstruction affirms the infinite possibilities of human exis-
tence. By contesting "necessity," deconstruction dissolves the ideological
encrustations of our thought.
F. Deconstruction as a Critical Theory
One might object that a deconstructive reassessment of our legal and
social institutions offers us no logical stopping point. If the results of a
deconstructive reading can themselves be deconstructed, deconstruction
threatens to become an endless series of reversals and counter-reversals.
Once again, nihilism seems an unavoidable consequence.
To answer this charge, I would like to compare deconstructive practice
(or at least my interpretation of it) to psychoanalysis. Such an analogy is
not at all farfetched. The psychoanalyst engages in a process similar in
many ways to deconstruction. The psychoanalyst reverses the privileging
of the conscious over the unconscious as the explanation of human behav-
ior.6 2 The psychoanalyst also performs a deconstructive reversal by focus-
ing on seemingly marginal or unimportant elements of the patient's expe-
rience, such as everyday events, free associations of ideas, and dream
material, to understand the deeper connections that are the key to uncon-
scious motivation.
63
61. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 289 (D. Kairys ed.
1982).
62. Michels, The Basic Propositions of Psychoanalytic Theory, in INTRODUCING PSYCHOANA-
LYTic THEORY 12 (S. Gillman ed. 1982) (psychoanalysis reverses emphasis on outer world as deter-
minant of human behavior and concerns itself with inner dispositions of individual).
63. See L. KOLB & H. BRODIE, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 750-55 (10th ed. 1982); see
also F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 276 (1966)
("Free association [involves] full and unedited reporting of mental events, including seemingly trivial
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Furthermore, both deconstruction and psychoanalysis offer critical theo-
ries.64 A critical theory may be distinguished by three characteristics.
First, the goal of a critical theory is not to develop a series of true factual
propositions, but to achieve enlightenment and emancipation. 5 Second, a
critical theory is self-referential; it may be applied to itself or to the pro-
cess of its application. 6 Third, a critical theory is confirmed not by a
process of experimentation and empirical verification, but through a more
complicated process of self-reflection. The critical theorist determines
whether she has achieved enlightenment and emancipation in terms of
knowledge and beliefs she has developed in the course of applying the
critical theory.
67
Psychoanalysis possesses all of the characteristics of a critical theory. Its
goal is emancipation of the patient from unfulfilling behavior patterns
caused by unconscious repressed material.6" This emancipation is achieved
by a process of progressive enlightenment: The patient learns how her
behavior patterns have been caused by unconscious forces and this, in
turn, alters her behavior.6 9 Psychoanalysis is potentially self-referential
because the process of analysis itself can be understood and criticized in
terms of hidden motivations and desires of the analyst."0 Finally, the suc-
cess of analysis often can only be judged through a process of self-
reflection by the patient, aided by the therapist.
7 1
Like psychoanalysis, deconstructive readings of texts offer the possibil-
ity of emancipation from customary ways of thinking. Deconstruction op-
erates by a momentary reversal of privileging. This reversal alters our
or obnoxious details.").
64. In this discussion of critical theory, I follow the ideas developed in R. GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A
CRITICAL THEORY 55-95 (1981).
65. Id. at 55.
66. This distinguishes critical theories from other types of theories. For example, Newton's theory
about particles in motion is not itself a particle in motion, and therefore, does not refer to or explain
itself. Id. By contrast, Marxism as a social theory is potentially self-referential. Id. at 56. It tries to
explain not only the connections between a person's beliefs and her relation to various economic
classes in society, but also why a Marxist holds the beliefs that she does.
67. Id. at 55-56, 85-86.
68. L. KOLB & H. BRODIE, supra note 63, at 748-49.
69. Id. at 749, 755.
70. For example, psychoanalytic psychotherapy applies the techniques of analysis to the analyst
herself when it addresses mistakes and failures in therapy due to countertransference:
[C]ountertransference reactions arise in the therapist as a result of the patient's influence on
the physician's unconscious feelings and have their origin in the latter's irrational projections
and identifications. The therapist must not permit his own unconscious feelings and attitudes,
aroused during phases of treatment, to intrude in his relations with the patient.
Id. at 752; see also S. LORAND, TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY 209-22 (1946) (discuss-
ing countertransference); Peters, Transference, in INTRODUCING PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, supra
note 62, at 99-101 (same).
71. See M. BASCH, DOING PSYCHOTHERAPY 36-37, 52, 178 (1980).
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view of the privileging, just as the act of uncovering repressed material
liberates the psychoanalytic patient.
As a critical theory, deconstruction can also be a self-referential activity
because it can be performed on previous deconstructive readings indefi-
nitely. It is this very property that leads to the charge of nihilism. How-
ever, the analogy to psychoanalysis shows us why this charge is ill-
founded. We do not think that psychoanalysis is futile because a patient
can be psychoanalyzed indefinitely or because the act of psychoanalysis
can itself be investigated psychoanalytically. Rather, we believe that the
psychoanalyst is performing a meaningful function even though her own
work is potentially subject to further psychoanalysis. More importantly,
the psychoanalyst and patient may properly decide that the patient has
progressed sufficiently to end analysis. Similarly, deconstruction need not
continue indefinitely if it has achieved the goals of emancipation and
enlightenment.
On the other hand, how is one to tell when these goals have been
achieved? There is no foolproof answer to this question for deconstruction,
but the same may be said for psychoanalysis. There is simply no mechani-
cal method for the analyst and patient to identify when analysis should
end. The decision is an act of self-reflection on the part of both that the
patient has been sufficiently enlightened and emancipated from the bur-
dens of repressed material."2 Of course, this decision may be questioned
on the grounds that it is subjective, that one person's "enlightenment"
may be another's neurosis. However, the analyst and patient are entitled
to employ a personal judgment based upon a vision of normalcy and good
mental health developed in the course of the analysis."
In the same fashion, the deconstructionist must engage in a process of
self-reflection to determine when the insights provided by deconstruction
have produced sufficient enlightenment with respect to a view of law, le-
gal doctrine, or human society previously accepted as privileged, natural,
or complete. This decision is, of course, a political and moral choice, but it
is one informed by insights gained through the activity of deconstruction
itself. At the moment the choice is made, the critical theorist is, strictly
speaking, no longer a deconstructionist. However, the purposes of engag-
ing in the deconstruction have been served. In both psychoanalysis and
deconstruction, the justification of when one should cease analysis may
72. Id.
73. Cf. F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 277 ("Analysis is essentially an educa-
tional process. . . . After a successful analysis, the patient will take with him the ability to introspect
. . . with candor and to apply such insights . . . to life problems.").
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appear self-supporting, and so it is. But such justification is a characteris-
tic of any critical theory."'
G. An Example of a Legal Deconstruction
At this point it might be useful to give an example of a deconstructive
argument in a legal context. I will use an argument by the noted British
legal scholar P.S. Atiyah, who is not generally known as a deconstruction-
ist. There is nothing unusual about the appearance of deconstructive ar-
guments in the texts of non-deconstructionists; recall Hume's deconstruc-
tion of Descartes' cogito.
7 5
In his Promises, Morals, and Law, 6 Atiyah argues against a theory of
contract that bases obligation upon individual will or intention. Atiyah
notes that the commonsense view of promissory obligation is that promises
are binding because of the intent of the party and its objective manifesta-
tion by the act of promising. He suggests that the explicit promise, with
its deliberate manifestation of intent, is usually viewed as the paradig-
matic case of contractual obligation. The law then attempts to explain the
binding nature of implied promises in terms of the standard case of
promising:
In law and, I think, with most contemporary writers on philosophy,
the traditional explanation of an implied promise assumes that the
explicit promise is the paradigm case. The implied promise is then
treated as a case where no explicit promise is made in so many
words, but where, from his words and conduct, it is plain that the
party intends to bind himself. Simple examples . . . concern con-
tracts made by boarding a bus . . . or ordering a meal in a restau-
rant. . . . The lawyer explains these obligations by saying that
there are implied promises.7
We can already see the hierarchical relationship at work. The paradig-
matic case of promissory obligation concerns explicit promises, in which
intention is manifested by specific promissory words. Implicit promises
are parasitic upon explicit promises: The intention to be bound is mani-
74. See R. GEUSS, supra note 64, at 85-88. Compare Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 580 (1983) ("Legal doctrine rightly understood and practiced is the
conduct of internal development through legal materials.") with J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
48-51 (1971) (sense of justice comes from matching initial convictions with proposed reconceptions in
attempt to achieve reflective equilibrium). Note that the establishment of a "reflective equilibrium"
creates a new privileging. The defense of the new privileging is a constructive, and not a deconstruc-
tive, activity,
75. See supra note 27.
76. P. ATiYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981) [hereinafter PROMISES, MORALS, AND
LAW].
77. Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
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fested (and thus implied) not by the defendant's words of promise, but by
her conduct. Thus, one explains the legal obligation of ordering a meal in
a restaurant in terms of previous cases in which people have intended to
purchase a meal and have said: "If you serve me food, I will pay you the
price listed on the menu," or words to that effect. But basing the obliga-
tory nature of implied promises upon explicit promises opens the way for
a deconstructive reversal of the hierarchy, a reversal that may tell us
something new about why promises are binding:
[T]here are difficulties with this traditional explanation. What of the
person who does not intend to pay his fare on boarding the bus, or
pay for the meal supplied to him in the restaurant? The lawyer
brushes aside this difficulty, appealing to what he calls the "objective
test" of promise or assent. There is the appearance of a promise and
that is enough. But this explanation is not very satisfying. For it
dismisses what is-on the traditional view-the very central require-
ment of a promise. If a person who intends to steal a ride on a bus is
liable to pay his fare in exactly the same way as the person who
intends to pay his fare, it seems odd to say that it is the intention
which creates the liability in both cases.7 8
Atiyah's argument calls into question whether it is really the intention
that creates the obligation. Indeed, even in the case of explicit promises,
we may wonder whether intention creates obligation. Imagine the person
who walks into the restaurant and says "I promise to pay for the food I
consume," when he has no intention of paying. Will his intention not to
be bound shield him from moral culpability or legal liability? Indeed, it is
precisely because he lacks the intention that he should be made to pay.
Atiyah notes that there is something strange about a theory of contractual
liability based upon intent:
[T]o imply a promise suggests that it is because of the promise that
the relevant party is bound by an obligation. He is obliged to pay for
the meal or pay the bus fare because he has promised. However, it
seems quite plausible to suggest that the truth is the other way
round. It is because he is bound by an obligation that we generally
feel impelled to imply a promise. Naturally, if that is right, the
source of the obligation cannot lie in the implied promise itself, but
must be sought elsewhere. . . . [I]t is often, perhaps always, the
case that the conduct itself justifies the creation of the obliga-
tion. . . . In the great majority of cases of this nature . . . the in-
tention to pay will exist, and so will the intention to assume or ac-
cept the legal obligation. But we must never forget the defaulter.
78. Id.
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Occasionally people do order meals in restaurants without any inten-
tion of paying. Nobody doubts-least of all the lawyer-that this
makes not the slightest difference to the obligation to pay.
We may translate this argument into Derrida's terminology. The classi-
cal theory of contract involves a privileging of explicit promises over im-
plicit promises because in explicit promises the thing that makes the con-
tract binding-the intention of the actor to enter into an agreement and be
bound by it-is in some sense more "present." The speaker's explicit
promise gives evidence of her "real" intentions. In the case of an implied
promise, these intentions are hidden, and can only be inferred from the
circumstances. A theory of implied promises supplements the will theory,
which explains the binding nature of explicit promises. The supplemen-
tary theory explains why there is a binding obligation when the prom-
isor's present intent is not immediately known to the promisee.
Following the logic of the supplement, however, we can argue that a
theory of explicit promises can only be supplemented if explicit promises
also defer presence (the present intention of the promisor at the moment
of promising). Explicit promises are binding because they manifest intent,
but the objective manifestation of intent in an explicit promise is only
binding because it acts as a signifier for presence (the promisor's actual
will or intent). However, as a sign, the explicit promise must be iterable.
Thus, an explicit promise could only bind a promisor if it could bind
regardless of the promisor's intent, that is to say, only if the dishonest
promisor also could be bound.
Atiyah has argued that this is how the law treats the dishonest prom-
isor.80 Promises are binding even if there is no connection between the
objective manifestation and the presence of subjective intention. The
"presence" of the promisor's intent at the moment of promising does not
create the moral obligation. Rather, we explain the obligation of explicit
promises in terms of the reasons implicit promises are binding: They con-
fer a benefit on the promisor that it would be unjust not to repay, or they
induce justified reliance on the part of the promisee.
This argument leads to a broader generalization. The privileging of a
will theory of contract over a theory based upon effect (unjust enrichment
or reliance) involves a relation of dirfrance-of mutual differentiation
and dependence. A theory that postulates the will of the promisor as bind-
ing must explain the moral obligation involved in cases in which the
promisor does not will herself to be bound, but accepts a benefit or creates
79. Id. at 173-74.
80. Id.
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detrimental reliance to the promisee. Thus, a will theory ultimately de-
pends upon the theory over which it is privileged.
Of course, the relation between privileging of ideas and construction of
ideologies gives Atiyah's deconstruction additional importance. Atiyah is
an historian as well as a legal theorist, and he recognizes the connection
between the will theory and the ideology of the nineteenth century."1 In-
deed, he argues that a consequence of the privileging of the will theory of
contract was the emphasis on purely executory contracts as the paradig-
matic case of moral and legal obligation (in contrast to cases of detrimen-
tal reliance or unjust enrichment) and the emphasis on the expectation
interest as the paradigm of what the law of contracts was designed to
protect (as opposed to the reliance or restitution interest).82
Needless to say, the law has moved a considerable distance from the
nineteenth century model in both respects. What is important for our pur-
poses is that the deconstruction of a privileging in a limited area of con-
tract doctrine exposes a more pervasive underlying ideology, which gave
rise to the privileging. Ironically, it also gives us the chance to investigate
the unquestioned ideological assumptions in our current doctrines. Thus,
the techniques of deconstruction, as a tool for the analysis of past and
present ideological thinking, are especially valuable to the legal philoso-
pher or historian.
Atiyah has used the tools of deconstructive practice to criticize the
classical will theory of contract. A deconstruction of an opposition, how-
ever, cannot by itself establish a new hierarchy in place of an old one,
because the new hierarchy also could be deconstructed. This is a point
Atiyah neglects, for he wants to argue that reliance and benefit are the
"real" sources of promissory obligation.83 In so doing, he wants to estab-
lish a new hierarchy. However, a theory of contract based wholly upon
benefit or reliance must explain why promises are binding immediately
after the parties enter into them, before detrimental effects have devel-
oped. Atiyah has great difficulty explaining the binding nature of these
promises, and concludes that if they are binding (which he doubts they
should be), there are only weak grounds for enforcing them.84 His conclu-
sion is not surprising, because the best explanation for the binding nature
81. Id. at 4-5, 7, 33. See generally P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CON-
TRAc'r (1979) [hereinafter THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr] (historical treatment of
nature of contractual and promissory liability).
82. See THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 81, at 424-29, 441-43,
456; PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW, supra note 76, at 33.
83. More specifically, he argues that the social group has determined that reliance and benefit are
the conditions for promissory obligation. PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW, supra note 76, at 129,
166-67, 193-94.
84. Id. at 208-12.
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of these promises is the intent of the two parties to bind themselves, an
explanation Atiyah has already rejected. In essence, Atiyah's benefit/reli-
ance theory of promissory obligation must admit its own "dangerous sup-
plement" to explain mutually unrelied upon executory promises. This
"dangerous supplement," of course, is a disguised version of the will
theory.
Note the irony: In the classical theory, the purely executory promise
was the paradigm case; the implied promise was the exception, and the
classical theory had to be supplemented with a theory explaining the
binding nature of implied obligations. However, this supplement was a
dangerous one, as Atiyah has shown. One might view explicit promises as
merely a special case of implied promises; that is, promises whose binding
nature lies in socially imposed norms and not in the assumption of indi-
vidual will. On the other hand, under Atiyah's benefit/reliance theory, the
acceptance of benefits or the creation of reliance becomes the paradigmatic
case of promissory obligation and the purely executory unrelied upon
promise becomes the exception, which must be explained by the use of a
supplementary theory of obligation.
Similarly, even Atiyah's basic premise, that promises are binding if
there is a pre-existing obligation in the form of a benefit received or detri-
mental reliance incurred, must smuggle in the will theory through the
back door:
Suppose, for example, that A and B "agree" on the sale of B's house
to A for £ 20,000. A promises to pay the price, and B promises to
convey the house. . . . The promises do not simply create obliga-
tions, on their own as it were. A's obligation to pay the price will not
arise just because he has promised: it will arise if and when he re-
ceives a conveyance of the house. B's obligation to convey does not
arise just from his promise: it arises if and when he receives the
price. . . . If [A] gets the house, he surely has an obligation to pay,
irrespective of the promise: it is not A's house, and B has no inten-
tion of making a gift .... 85
Atiyah argues that A is obligated because B has conferred a benefit on
him (and therefore A would be unjustly enriched if he did not perform).
This raises the question of how we know that A would be unjustly en-
riched. Atiyah responds that B did not intend to make a gift of the house.
Thus, Atiyah's benefit/reliance theory of obligation turns upon the intent
of B, and we are back to a version of the will theory.
I have not refuted Atiyah's skeptical arguments regarding the will the-
85. Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added).
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ory of contract. On the contrary, Atiyah's deconstruction of the will theory
of contract is quite successful. Atiyah is wrong, however, in thinking that
he has shown that a new ground of explanation will succeed where the
old one has failed. Rather, he has demonstrated that the will theory and
the benefit/reliance theory of promissory obligation exist in a relation of
diffrance, that is, of mutual differentiation and dependence. This conclu-
sion is unsatisfying to someone who seeks an ultimate ground for contrac-
tual obligation, but Derrida's work suggests that this is the best that can
be done.
II. THE LIBERATION OF TEXT FROM AUTHOR
A. Readings and Misreadings
Derrida's conclusion that there is only "writing," that there are only
signs and metaphors for still other signs and metaphors, has interesting
consequences for a theory of interpretation. These consequences are im-
portant to lawyers, who are greatly concerned with the interpretation of
texts.
I want to introduce these ideas with a simple paradigm of textual inter-
pretation. According to this simple paradigm, a text is a representation of
an author's intent. Thus, a novel represents a story (and artistic ideas)
that a novelist wishes to express. A philosophical treatise represents ideas
that a philosopher wishes to convey. A judicial opinion stands for the
principles of decision that are used to decide a case. The goal of interpre-
tation is understanding the meaning of the text, that is, the author's in-
tent. If we interpret correctly, we grasp the author's intent; if we interpret
incorrectly, we miss the author's intent.
This simple paradigm of interpretation is not a popular theory of inter-
pretation among literary critics these days."6 However, the simple para-
digm of interpretation continues to be well-respected among legal thinkers
as a preferred method of interpreting legal texts. Indeed, if most lawyers
or judges were asked how statutes or judicial decisions should be inter-
preted, they would probably respond that the author's intent is the most
86. Indeed, the reader-response movement in literary criticism has championed the role of the
reader in constructing the meaning of texts. See generally S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? (1980); S. MAILLOUX, INTERPRETIVE CONVENTIONS: THE READER IN THE STUDY OF
AMERICAN FICTION (1982); THE READER IN THE TET (S. Suleiman & I. Crosman eds. 1980);
READER-REsPONSE CRITICISM (J. Tompkins ed. 1980). Only a few literary critics, such as E.D.
Hirsch, still hold to the view that the author's intent is the primary source of interpretation. See, e.g.,
E.D. HIRSCH, THE AIMs OF INTERPRETATION (1976); E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETA-
TION (1967).
Of course, the argument that the primary source of meaning lies in the reader's response rather
than in the author's intention involves a privileging as much as the reverse claim, and therefore, is
equally subject to deconstruction. The relation between author and reader is one of diftfrance.
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important factor.8 7 As I shall argue later, the strong hold that the theory
of authorial intent has upon legal thinkers probably arises from its associ-
ation with the principle of the Rule of Law."'
I would now like to give a particular example of how the simple para-
digm of interpretation operates in a legal setting. Suppose that Brown v.
Board of Education 9 had just been decided. A black janitor files suit in a
federal district court in Mississippi, contesting a "coloreds only" seating
section in a cafeteria at a municipal office building. The district court
must decide whether Brown (and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
that it interprets) outlaws the maintenance of "separate but equal" dining
facilities in an establishment operated by a municipal government. Ac-
cording to the simple paradigm of interpretation, if the court holds one
way, it has read Brown correctly, while if it holds another way, it has
misinterpreted or misapplied Brown.90
It is possible to distinguish Brown on the ground that it applies only to
schools, where impressionable children will be greatly affected by the per-
ception of separate treatment. This is a possible interpretation of Brown,
and I mention it because it is important to understand that distinguishing
a case is as much an interpretation as following it. On the other hand,
following the simple paradigm of interpretation, this reading may misin-
terpret Brown because the authors of Brown intended that all separate but
87. "Although there have been occasional heretics, it is an article of faith among American law-
yers that the function of a court when dealing with a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of
the legislature." Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Inter-
pretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1975) (footnote omit-
ted); see also R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 36 (1975)
(same); J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 32-40 (1982) (fundamental principle of statutory con-
struction is inquiry into legislative intent); 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 45.05, at 20-22 (Sands 4th ed. 1984) ("An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions consid-
ering statutory issues are written in the context of legislative intent."). Although Professor Murphy
expresses the prevailing view, the number of "heretics" is greater than his quotation suggests. See,
e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) (legislative intent fictional and
irrelevant concept); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1410 (tent. ed. 1958) (unpublished man-
uscript) (legislative purpose created by courts and not identical with intent).
In constitutional law, where there is perhaps the greatest controversy about proper methods of
textual interpretation, the simple paradigm remains surprisingly strong. E.g., R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). Even more
liberal authors often pay lip service to the principle of authorial intent. Ronald Dworkin, who argues
that the Framers' intent is not a psychological fact to be discovered but only something to be invented,
still makes an obeisance to the simple paradigm when he proposes that one should look to the Fram-
ers' general abstract concepts of "due process" and "equal protection," rather than to specific concrete
conceptions of these ideas in practice. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,
477, 488-91, 497 (1981).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90. This statement is true not only of the simple paradigm. Many other theories of interpretation
label readings as proper or improper, although they might reach different results in individual cases.
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equal public facilities for blacks and whites should be considered pre-
sumptively unconstitutional.
The simple paradigm of interpretation involves a privileging. There are
many possible readings of Brown v. Board of Education, and these read-
ings can take place in a multitude of different factual and legal contexts.
However, some of these readings are correct, and others are incorrect. In-
correct readings are mistakes of legal reasoning, which should be elimi-
nated from a legal system to the greatest extent possible. The common-
sense understanding of legal reasoning, then, is premised upon a
distinction between readings and misreadings of legal materials. There-
fore, the goal of good legal interpretation is to separate the correct read-
ings from the incorrect readings. 1
Now this privileging of readings over misreadings can be deconstructed.
Culler's treatment of the subject, although it does not specifically concern
legal texts, is excellent:
When one attempts to formulate the distinction between reading and
misreading, one inevitably relies on some notion of identity and dif-
ference. Reading and understanding preserve or reproduce a content
or meaning, maintain its identity, while misunderstanding and mis-
reading distort it; they produce or introduce a difference. But one
can argue that in fact the transformation or modification of meaning
that characterizes misunderstanding is also at work in what we call
understanding. If a text can be understood, it can in principle be
understood repeatedly, by different readers in different circum-
stances. These acts of reading or understanding are not, of course,
identical. They involve modifications and differences, but differences
which are deemed not to matter. We can thus say, in a formulation
more valid than its converse, that understanding is a special case of
misunderstanding, a particular deviation or determination of misun-
derstanding. It is misunderstanding whose misses do not matter. The
interpretive operations at work in a generalized misunderstanding or
misreading give rise both to what we call understanding and to what
we call misunderstanding.
The claim that all readings are misreadings can also be justified
by the most familiar aspects of critical and interpretive practice.
Given the complexities of texts, the reversibility of tropes, the ex-
tendability of context, and the necessity for a reading to select and
organize, every reading can be shown to be partial. Interpreters are
able to discover features and implications of a text that previous in-
terpreters neglected or distorted. They can use the text to show that
previous readings are in fact misreadings, but their own readings
91. Again, even if one did not subscribe to the simple paradigm of interpretation, it still might
make sense to speak of correct and incorrect interpretations of legal texts. One would not even have to
claim that there was only one correct interpretation to speak in this way.
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will be found wanting by later interpreters, who may astutely iden-
tify the dubious presuppositions or particular forms of blindness to
which they testify. The history of readings is a history of misread-
ings, though under certain circumstances these misreadings can be
and may have been accepted as readings. 2
Lawyers' readings of cases are partial in two senses of the word. First,
they are partial in Culler's sense, in that they represent only some aspects
of the meaning of texts. They are also partial in a second sense, in that
they are interpretations that benefit (and thus are partial to) the position
they advocate. Certainly, the second kind of partiality is likely to lead to
the first. The interpretations of judges are no less partial in either sense of
the word. The materials of the law-cases, constitutions, and stat-
utes-take on new meanings as legal contexts change. Throughout his-
tory, interpretations are constantly offered, some of which are later la-
belled misreadings. The history of the law is iteration; the development of
law is the development of legal materials, which are subjected to new in-
terpretations as we read them over and over again in different factual,
historical, and political contexts.
The deconstruction of the opposition of readings and misreadings is at
first troubling to lawyers because our legal system seems to depend upon
the ability to distinguish readings from misreadings. If all readings of le-
gal materials are actually misreadings, then law cannot be a rational en-
terprise and the Rule of Law is impossible to achieve. Before reaching this
conclusion, however, we should consider exactly what the deconstruction
of the understanding/misunderstanding privileging has accomplished.
Once again, Culler's thoughts on the matter prove instructive:
Attacks on deconstructionists . . . frequently emphasize that if all
reading is misreading, then the notions of meaning, value, and au-
thority promoted by our institutions are threatened. Each reader's
reading would be as valid or legitimate as another, and neither
teachers nor texts could preserve their wonted authority. What such
inversions do, though, is displace the question, leading one to con-
sider what are the processes of legitimation, validation, or authoriza-
tion that produce differences among readings and enable one reading
to expose another as a misreading. In the same way, identification of
the normal as a special case of the deviant helps one to question the
92. J. CULLER, supra note 1, at 176. The same arguments may be applied to my interpretation of
Derrida in this Article. By interpreting Derrida, I present his ideas in a necessarily selective and
ordered fashion. My reading of Derrida is partial, and therefore, may be classified as a "misreading"
in the more general sense Culler describes. However, to use Culler's phrase, I would argue that it is a
misreading whose misses do not matter much.
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institutional forces and practices that institute the normal by mark-
ing or excluding the deviant.
In general, inversions of hierarchical oppositions expose to debate
the institutional arrangements that rely on the hierarchies and thus
open possibilities of change-possibilities which may well come to
little but which may also at some point prove critical.93
Put another way, the deconstructive reversal has not demonstrated that
all readings of Brown v. Board of Education are equally legitimate, but
rather has called into question the ways in which we decide that a given
interpretation of Brown is illegitimate. This issue is important for two
reasons. First, our justifications of what are "proper" interpretations of a
text are not always consistent. 4 Second, our method of privileging inter-
pretations as appropriate or inappropriate is often tantamount to deciding
a legal issue. It becomes the process by which we formulate legal doctrine,
and will serve to foster or foreclose later doctrinal developments.
We may make a comparison here with the use of deconstruction to
privilege legal concepts informed by ideological thinking. Just as decon-
struction does not prove the bankruptcy of all social visions but rather
affirms the many possible characterizations of social life, so too the decon-
93. Id. at 179.
94. For example, there are clauses of the Constitution we would probably read quite literally,
confining our interpretations to the plain meaning of the words. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5
(president must be at least 35 years old). Other clauses, like the equal protection clause, are more
ambiguous and require a fuller theory of interpretation, which would no doubt be more controversial.
In still other cases, we read the Constitution in ways clearly at odds with the ordinary meaning of its
language. The Eleventh Amendment, for example, literally bans all suits, in law or equity, against a
state by citizens of another state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Yet the amendment is most often invoked
to bar suits by citizens against their own state, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Suits in
equity against a state are permitted through the fiction of suing a state officer in her official capacity,
e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); suits for monetary damages are permitted if the relief
sought is prospective rather than retrospective, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664, 668. Even suits for
retrospective relief in the form of damages are permitted, if the state is held to waive its immunity. Id.
at 671-74.
Ironically, the rule for determining waiver is that a state will be deemed to have waived its immu-
nity "only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'" Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v.
Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). This interpretative principle is quite at odds with
the principles used to interpret the Eleventh Amendment itself.
Our use of different methods of reading constitutional and statutory texts does not necessarily mean
that we are contradicting ourselves. We could defend different hermeneutical principles for interpret-
ing waiver under the Eleventh Amendment and for interpreting the amendment itself on the grounds
that the rules for statutory interpretation must be different from those for divining the meaning of the
Constitution. A similar explanation could be developed to show why the Eleventh Amendment should
be interpreted differently than other clauses of the Constitution. Rather, deconstruction calls these
interpretative practices into question and requires us to articulate a political and legal theory to ex-
plain the differences. This process also may cause us to reevaluate our hermeneutical practices. Com-
pare Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985) (defending current Eleventh Amend-
ment doctrines on general grounds of preserving federalism) with Edelman, 415 U.S. at 687-88
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (Eleventh Amendment immunity should be restricted to cases falling within
its literal meaning: suits against a state brought by citizens of another state).
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struction involved here is designed to create possibilities for interpretation
rather than to foreclose them. In introducing deconstructive strategies to
texts it cannot be stressed too much that freedom and nihilism are not the
same thing.
The deconstructive critique of the privileging of readings over misread-
ings does have a further consequence, which may at first prove unsettling
to lawyers: The simple (or intent-based) theory of interpretation of legal
texts is necessarily incomplete. However, as I will now show, this conse-
quence is actually necessary for the Rule of Law to operate in the manner
we think it should.
B. The Free Play of Text and the Rule of Law
Someone says to me:
"Shew the children a game." I teach them gaming with dice, and the
other says "I didn't mean that sort of game." Must the exclusion of
the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave me the
order?95
One of the most important ideas that Derrida's work demonstrates is
that if (as everyone thinks) we mean more than we say, we also say more
than we mean. Our words seem to perform tricks that we had not in-
tended, establish connections that we had not considered, lead to conclu-
sions that were not present to our minds when we spoke or wrote. Stu-
dents of statutory construction and the law of contracts are no doubt
familiar with many examples of this phenomenon. This curious habit of
our words to burst the seams of our intentions and to produce their own
kind of logic is what Derrida labels the free "play" of text. 6
For Derrida, what we did not intend to say is as interesting as what we
did intend. That is why so much of his work makes use of puns, or inves-
tigates how what a text says refers to itself or what it does. Much of
deconstructive criticism involves the discovery of unintended connections
between words. One reason for looking for such connections is that- they
may condense or crystallize important ideas that are already present in a
text. (This is one reason we find slogans and aphorisms so effective in
conveying ideas.) But there is a more important reason to investigate the
unintended connections between the words in our texts. It is simply a
95. L. WiTTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVEsTIGATIONS § 70 (1953).
96. See, e.g., WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 1, at 292 ("Play is the disruption of pres-
ence."). A more trivial, yet classic, example of unexpected connections between words is the common
pun. Derrida's work often relies on puns to emphasize connections among ideas in a text. See, e.g.,
DISSEMINATION, supra note 1, at 65-171, 173-285 ("Plato's Pharmacy" and "The Double Session").
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logocentric bias on our part to think that the most important meanings in
a text are those the author intended to put there.
In literature, the critic does not think less of her interpretation of Moby
Dick because Melville did not see the same connections as he composed his
work. A philosopher does not think less of her critique of the Phaedo
when she discovers a connection between ideas that Plato did not recog-
nize in his text. Indeed, there is generally great critical importance in
discovering that a text says more than the author meant it to say, or that
the logic of a text leads to an unexpected difficulty or contradiction. Often,
hidden flaws or strengths in a work of literature or philosophical treatise
only become apparent over time. Legal texts, like other texts, often pre-
sent later readers with new meanings, connections, and difficulties that
their creators did not contemplate. These meanings are uncovered by the
interpretations of successive readers in different historical and cultural
contexts.
There are two different reasons that one might be concerned with unin-
tended connections. The first is not Derrida's purpose, although the sec-
ond is. One might use unintended meanings in a legal text to criticize the
reasoning of the author. In her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health,7 Justice O'Connor argued that the viability-
based doctrine of Roe v. Wade" would self-destruct as the point of the
fetus' viability came earlier and earlier during pregnancy while technology
assured that the time at which abortions were virtually risk free to the
mother came later and later." This consequence of the Roe decision was
not envisioned by its author, Justice Blackmun, and Justice O'Connor be-
lieved that this unintended consequence was an important criticism of the
logic of Justice Blackmun's opinion.
On the other hand, the discovery of unintended connections and diffi-
culties may not involve any criticism of the author at all. A good example
is our current understanding of the equal protection clause. The drafters
of the equal protection clause probably did not contemplate that one day
its words would strike constitutional scholars and judges as requiring
equality between men and women. However, when we read the equal
protection clause today, with an expansive notion of equality that would
have greatly upset the framers of that amendment, we do not mean to
97. 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. The Roe framework. . . is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical risks of
various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may regulate for reasons of
maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical science becomes
better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved
further back toward conception.
462 U.S. at 458.
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criticize their choice of words. Indeed, we demonstrate how their linguistic
commitment to equality has brought us to a deeper political commitment
to equality. We celebrate the manner in which the authors' words have
worked themselves pure in spite of the authors' intentions.
When Derrida hunts for unseen connections in a text, he is usually not
attempting to discover errors in the thought of the author. His is not the
sort of task that Justice O'Connor undertook in the Akron case. Instead,
he is looking for the type of connections that no author can avoid because
no author intends them. Derrida seeks to understand the gap between
what the author commands by her language and what the language per-
forms-the uncontrollable incongruity in human language and thought.
As Barbara Johnson explains, "the deconstructive reading does not point
out the flaws or weaknesses or stupidities of an author, but the necessity
with which what he does see is systematically related to what he does not
see."
100
There is an important connection between the principle of the "free
play" of text and Derrida's theory of the sign. For Derrida, a sign can
only signify to the extent that it can signify repeatedly, in a number of
different contexts. The essential property of the sign is its iterability. It
follows from Derrida's theory of the sign that we can use signs if and only
if they are separable from our intent-if and only if they "mean" whether
or not they mean what we intend. Thus, if I write a heartfelt love letter to
my girlfriend, in order to communicate my most deeply felt sentiments
through language, it must also be possible for the same words to be writ-
ten insincerely, in jest, or even through random creation by a computer
program. Language can signify only if it can escape the actual present
meaning it had to the person who used it.101
This surprising conclusion stems from the fact that signs can only be
used for communication if they are public. They must be capable of repe-
tition and manipulation by any possible user.10 2 But the public nature of
communication necessitates that signs signify repeatedly, regardless of the
presence or absence of a present meaning that informs them. A piece of
graffiti continues to signify as long as it remains on the wall. Thus, to the
extent that B can understand A, it is A's (iterable) signs, and not A's
intention, which permits this understanding.
Moreover, the essence of the sign, iterability, carries with it the notion
of a repetition of the same in a different context. Language can only oper-
ate to the extent that it is repeatable, but language is repeatable only to
100. Johnson, supra note 1, at xv.
101. See MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 1, at 317.
102. Id. at 315.
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the extent that what A says means something, albeit not identical to what
A meant, to another person B. According to Derrida:
[Ilt belongs to the sign to be legible, even if the moment of its pro-
duction is irremediably lost, and even if I do not know what its al-
leged author-scriptor meant consciously and intentionally at the mo-
ment he wrote it, that is[,] abandoned it to its essential drifting
. . . . [B]y virtue of its essential iterability[,] one can always lift a
written syntagma from the interlocking chain in which it is caught
or given without making it lose every possibility of functioning, if not
every possibility of "communicating," precisely.103
The structural precondition of the sign is its ability to break free from
the author, and to mean other than what the author meant. The very act
of "meaning" something creates a chasm between the sign and the pro-
ducer's intention. This detachability makes iterability, and thus intersub-
jective meaning, possible. The repetition of the sign in the new context is
simultaneously a relation of identity and difference; the repeated sign is
syntactically identical, yet semantically different. The result is that the
text, as it is repeatedly understood, takes on a life of its own in a relation
of diffrance with the person who "meant" it:
[A]t the very moment when someone would like to say or to write,
"On the twentieth . . . etc.," the very factor that will permit the
mark (be it psychic, oral, graphic) to function beyond this mo-
ment-namely the possibility of its being repeated another
time-breaches, divides, expropriates the "ideal" plenitude or self-
presence of intention, of meaning (to say) and, afortiori, of all ade-
quation between meaning and saying. Iterability alters, contaminat-
ing parasitically what it identifies and enables to repeat "itself"; it
leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is (already,
always, also) other than what we mean (to say) . .. .10
Derrida's aphorism, "iterability alters,"10 5 is a shorthand way of saying
that once the signifier leaves the author's creation and is let loose upon the
world, it takes on a life of its own in the other contexts in which it can be
repeated.10 6 The liberation of the text from the author at the moment of
creation results in the free play of the text.
103. Id. at 317.
104. Limited Inc abc, supra note I, at 200.
105. Id. Derrida also makes a pun on the two possible origins of the word "iterable": "iter-," or
"again," comes from the Sanskrit "itera," or "other." The philological ploy suggests that repetition
differentiates even as it imitates. Id.
106. Under the simple theory of interpretation, we might still insist that the text has a meaning
independent from its context: a clearly definable "core" of meaning that cannot be varied by context.
According to this theory, context affects only the "peripheral" meanings of the text while preserving
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Moreover, if the meaning of a signifier is context bound, context is
boundless-that is, there are always new contexts that will serve to in-
crease the different meanings of a signifier. 107 This should come as no
surprise to a legal thinker: The words in a statute or in a case used as
precedent take on new meanings in new factual contexts, and cannot be
confined to a limited number of meanings. There are an indefinite num-
ber of possible contexts in which a given legal text could be read. For this
reason, a text is always threatening to overflow into an indefinite number
of different significations108
Most of us assume that the Rule of Law requires that legal materials
will be essentially determinate in meaning; that there will be a privileged
interpretation of a legal text. If a text had many meanings, and no one
"authentic" or privileged meaning, it would be impossible to treat like
cases alike according to general and knowable universal principles equally
applicable to all citizens. Moreover, if a text had many equally valid in-
terpretations, no interpretation could have an exclusive claim to legitimacy
and command the respect of all citizens.
The simple theory of interpretation seems to offer us just such a privi-
leged interpretation. It provides that the privileged interpretation of a le-
gal text is the one consistent with the intention of the author who created
it. The simple theory has two advantages. First, it avoids the uncertainty
and arbitrariness that would follow if all interpretations were equally
valid. It creates the possibility of a single, knowable interpretation of legal
materials, which can be applied in a non-arbitrary fashion to all citizens.
the "core." Thus, context is only supplementary to the basic, unchanging meaning of the text.
The "core/periphery" distinction can be deconstructed by noting that the "core" depends as much
on the context as the "periphery" does. Both the core and the periphery are context dependent. The
core meaning of the word "cow" provides a simple example. If two parties have adopted a code for
contracts involving livestock where "cow" means "horse," the core meaning of "cow" will shift radi-
cally. This may look like a trick, but it is the "normal" context in which we use the word "cow" that
gives us its "core' meaning.
In Derrida's terminology, context is a dangerous supplement to the meaning of a text. "Context"
indicates both that which accompanies the text (con- as in convocation) and that which is posed
against the text, or which the text is read against (con- as in contra). Both readings are important, for
the text is both dependent upon and differentiated from its context. Text and context thus exist in a
relation of differance. There is no text without a context.
107. See J. CULLER, supra note 1, at 123-28.
108. I use the word "indefinite" and not "infinite." What is important is not the number of
possible new contexts, but their unexpectedness. Theoretically, it always should be possible to derive
an infinite number of meanings from a text if we are willing to acknowledge all sorts of bizarre ways
of reading the text. However, some of these contexts are probably irrelevant in the further context of
our legal institutions. (For example, one might look for meanings in a legal text by searching for
hidden anagrams that stated a rule.) Although we can be sure that some contexts will be irrelevant,
we cannot predict which contexts will be relevant in the future. The number of such contexts may not
be infinite, but it is indefinite. We cannot create an all-inclusive list in advance. To use an earlier
example, what makes the equal protection clause uncanny in its moral force is the unexpected nature
of classifications we may come to see in time as requiring equal treatment or permitting differential
treatment.
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Second, the simple theory establishes the legitimacy of the interpretation,
for it adopts the meaning of the author (judge, framer, or legislator) who
had the authority to create the legal text in the first place. Thus, at first
glance, the Rule of Law appears to reject the idea of the free play of text
and to embrace instead the simple theory of interpretation: The meaning
of a legal text is the meaning of its author, which does not change as the
text is introduced into new factual situations or contexts.
However, the grounding of the Rule of Law on the privileging of the
author's intent can be deconstructed, and then we see that the relation of
the Rule of Law to the author's intent is not so unambiguous. We dis-
cover that the Rule of Law must also depend upon the free play of legal
texts, an idea which bears a relationship of differance to the simple theory
of interpretation.
Let us consider, as an example, a published opinion of a judge appear-
ing in a case reporter. What is the legal effect of this opinion on subse-
quent cases? The simple theory of interpretation would suggest that (if
the precedent is binding) what the judge/author intended is the principle
that controls succeeding cases. However, this will not do. The intent of the
author does not control, but rather the interpretation of the author's intent
as derived by subsequent readers of the text controls. It is the text as read,
and not the text as written, that becomes the law.
The principle of iterability explains this result. The Rule of Law can-
not operate unless legal materials (which in theory, are what bind per-
sons) are iterable. The Rule of Law presupposes that the same corpus of
legal materials will be applied to case A as to case B. If a different rule
were applied in each case we would not have the Rule of Law. 09 How-
ever, the author's present intent when she creates legal materials is not
iterable; it is forever lost at the moment of creation. All that remains is the
sign, the existence of which makes intersubjective communication possible.
The iterability of the sign of the author's intent, and not the intent itself,
is essential to the operation of the Rule of Law.
In addition, the Rule of Law is based upon the premise that it is not
the individual wills of people that control, but laws passed by elected rep-
resentatives or case law construed and developed by judges. Rule by the
arbitrary will of persons would violate the Liberal principle of auton-
omy;210 social coercion is not achieved according to arbitrary will, but ac-
109. I pass over the obvious difficulty that the corpus of laws is constantly changing, so that if
case B appears later in time than case A, different legal rules may apply to it. This is a problem for
the theory of the Rule of Law, not for my deconstruction.
110. The principle of autonomy holds that persons should be free from coercion by the arbitrary
will of another. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrTION OF LIBERTY 139-40 (1960). Recognition of legal
rights according to the Rule of Law preserves this principle by preventing inconsistent and arbitrary
treatment of persons. Id.
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cording to general, equally applicable rules. Once the rules are established
by the governing authority, the rules constitute the authority for deciding
cases. Thus, the Rule of Law presupposes that texts rule, and not the
persons who created them.
Of course, in deciding the proper application of the rule, we look to the
purpose of the governing body that created it. However, that body may
not have had a single purpose or it may not have explicitly considered the
factual situation at issue. Indeed, many of the legislators may not have
read the measure thoroughly before voting on it.
The "purpose" used by a legal interpreter or decisionmaker is not the
pure present purpose of the creator of the legal text. Instead, it is a con-
structed purpose: a reading of the text (a statute or decision) and of other
texts (legislative history) in a particular context. The "purpose" that we
discover and use in the application of a legal rule comes from texts, and
not from the author.
Moreover, the Rule of Law requires that a legal text be separated from
the purpose present in the mind of the creator of the text. As an example,
suppose that airlines lobby for the passage of a law that sets minimum
prices for airfares. Assume that legislator A voted for the bill in return for
a favor from legislator B. This is not the kind of purpose that a judge can
use to construe a statute's operation in a particular context. Nor could A's
intent to receive a bribe in exchange for a vote be properly considered.
The Rule of Law ultimately relies upon a distinction between proper and
improper interpretive purposes. This distinction, in turn, can be decon-
structed, but my point here is that the decisionmaker who seeks a purpose
must reconstitute, reconstruct, or interpret a purpose from still other in-
terpretations or signs. She must separate those purposes which are "ap-
propriate" from those which are inappropriate. This act of discovery is an
interpretation and deferral of "presence," i.e., the purpose "present" to
the mind of the creator of the legal text at the time of its creation, and
indeed, may even be a rejection of it.
Another example may prove instructive. Assume that the sole purpose
of price control regulation is to benefit the airline industry. After intense
lobbying, the legislators are convinced that they need to outlaw "cutthroat
competition" among the airlines. Suppose that economic conditions then
change, and the airlines will lose revenue unless they can increase volume
by dropping their prices below the minimum price levels. We would not
read the statute to mean that minimum prices no longer control, even
though that would achieve the authors' purpose of benefiting the airline
industry. Rather, we must admit that the text of the statute has taken on a
life of its own, apart from the original purpose of the legislators who cre-
ated it.
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The statute's claim to legal authority is derived not from the intent of
its framers, but from its present signification. The institutional rules that
give binding authority to acts of government recognize the sign (the text)
and not the signified (the purpose). The Rule of Law presupposes that
the only legitimate solution to the change in economic conditions is to pass
a new statute repealing the old price support legislation.111
The simple theory of interpretation is a logocentric theory, relying upon
the "presence" of the author's intent at the moment of textual creation. By
deconstructing, or "ungrounding" it, we see that the Rule of Law depends
upon the free play of text, as much as it depends upon the author's intent.
From this deconstruction emerge two mutually differentiated and depen-
dent visions of interpretative practice:
The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an ori-
gin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the
necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer
turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond [the]
man . . . who . . . [-]throughout his entire history-has dreamed
of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of
play ....
There are more than enough indications today to suggest we
might perceive that these two interpretations of interpreta-
tion-which are absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simul-
taneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy-together share
the field which we call, in such a problematic fashion, the social
sciences.
For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge
and accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do
not believe that today there is any question of choosing-in the first
place because here we are in a region (let us say, provisionally, a
region of historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly
111. The same arguments apply to the interpretation of judicial opinions. If the simple theory of
interpretation were required by the Rule of Law, we might be tempted to try to solve today's difficult
problems of constitutional law by communicating with the spirit of Chief Justice Marshall, and by
asking him what exactly he meant in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). However,
I hope that the reader will find something odd about this solution, aside from the idea that judges
should be performing seances or raising the dead. Like the Constitution itself, Marbury as text has
meanings that live on independently of the meanings of its creator. Therefore, even the author of the
text, were he here to communicate with us, would not have a monopoly on the "real" meaning of
Marbury. Rather, we understand intuitively that the author has already had his "bite at the apple."
Once he has expressed himself, it is the opinion that binds future judges. This, too, is a necessary
consequence of the Rule of Law.
Of course, if a Supreme Court Justice writes an opinion, she does, in a sense, have a "second bite at
the apple" because she will be able to vote for subsequent applications of the original opinion. But her
interpretation of her own writing will not be conclusive; she will have to convince four other Justices.
The point is easier to understand if one considers a Justice who retires after writing a given opinion.
In subsequent cases, it would be inappropriate to ask her what she meant in her opinion and to accept
her views as binding.
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trivial; and in the second, because we must first try to conceive of the
common ground, and the differance of this irreducible difference. 12
The purpose of the deconstruction is not to establish that any interpre-
tation of a text is acceptable, but that the yearning for originary meaning
in the simple theory of interpretation is incomplete and cannot serve as a
foundation for interpretation. We must, to some degree, acknowledge the
free play of the text. However, as Derrida notes above, there can be no
question of choosing the free play of legal texts as a new ground for inter-
pretative practice, a fact that critics of original intent theory may too eas-
ily forget. The intent theory and a theory of free play must coexist in an
uneasy alliance in which neither can be master nor servant. The relation
of differance between them prevents either from serving as an originary
ground of interpretative practice.
Of course, I have only considered two possible approaches to interpreta-
tion: one that looks to the intent of the author, and one that acknowledges
the free play of the text. Derrida's critique, however, extends much fur-
ther. As soon as the author's original intent is displaced as the foundation
of interpretative practice, the critic finds that she must substitute a new
ground for her interpretative theory, and this theory too, must depend
upon and define itself in terms of that which it excludes. Thus, the critic
who replaces "original intent" by "intersubjective meaning," "historical
development," or "shared consensus of values," must reinstitute a new
form of presence, which is subject to further deconstruction.11
112. WRrnNG AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 1, at 292-93.
113. Consider, for example, theorists who advocate using tradition, moral consensus, or conven-
tional morality as the basis of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Lupu, Untangling the Strands of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 985, 1040-41 (1979); Perry, Substantive Due
Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 425 (1976);
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973). Such a proposal involves a privileging of traditional over non-
traditional values, of non-controversial over controversial attitudes, and of conventional over non-
conventional morality. Dean Ely deconstructs this privileging by showing that arguments for this
interpretative theory undo themselves: "[P]art of the point of the Constitution is to check today's
majority . . . 'If the Constitution protects only interests which comport with traditional values, the
persons most likely to be penalized for their way of life will be those least likely to receive judicial
protection."' J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DsmusTR 62 (1980) (quoting Karst, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70,
136 (1977)). Thus, the argument for enforcing the privileged concept, traditional values, becomes an
argument for enforcing the excluded concept, non-traditional values. Similarly, one can show that the
argument for enforcing values agreed upon by a majority of the public deconstructs itself. As Ely
notes, "it makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting
minorities from the value judgments of the majority." Id. at 69.
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III. CONCLUSION
Deconstruction by its very nature is an analytic tool and not a synthetic
one. It can displace a hierarchy momentarily, it can shed light on other-
wise hidden dependences of concepts, but it cannot propose new hierar-
chies of thought or substitute new foundations. These are by definition
logocentric projects, which deconstruction defines itself against. Decon-
struction is thus revelatory, and what the legal theorist does with the reve-
lation is not dictated by the deconstruction itself, nor could it be.
In theory then, deconstructive readings of legal texts can be a tool of
analysis for the right as well as for the left. In practice, left legal scholars
will probably make more use of deconstructive techniques for two reasons:
first, because of the historical connection between continental philosophy
and left political thought, and second, because the left usually has more to
gain from showing the ideological character of the status quo than does
the right.
114
Deconstructive readings, at least in the sense used in this Article, do not
demonstrate that legal thought is incoherent any more than they demon-
strate that all forms of logocentric practice are incoherent. Similarly,
deconstructive readings do not demonstrate that legal thought is any more
irrational than any other form of logocentric thought. Rather, what decon-
struction demonstrates is the djferance between what is privileged and
what is excluded in legal thought. Deconstruction thus reveals the anti-
nomal character of legal thought, a characterization which is at first dis-
turbing, but in the end is the best description of our actual experience in
using legal concepts.
114. On the other hand, an economic libertarian might well use deconstructive techniques to criti-
cize the modem welfare state on the grounds that it rests upon a false privileging of certain aspects of
human nature.
786
Vol. 96: 743, 1987
